

Michael Willis Chase, Pro Se  
P.O. Box 4461,  
Sedona, Arizona 86340  
Email: aloha777sedona@gmail.com  
Phone: 928-399-9688

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OCT 25 2021

YAVAPAI COUNTY ATTORNEY

**IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI**

THE STATE OF ARIZONA )

PLAINTIFF, )

VS )

Michael Willis Chase )

ACCUSED. )

CASE NO. V1300CR201980661

**Demand For Answers To Administrative  
and Procedural Matters Questions.**

**Brief #3 in Support of Demand to Dismiss  
Court, Judges And Prosecutor Who Have  
No Force of Law Over The Accused.**

**Declared Witnessed Testimony Of Michael Willis Chase  
RE: Demand For Answers To Administrative and Procedural  
Matters Question. And Brief #3 in Support of Demand to Dismiss  
Court, Judges and Prosecutor Who Have No Force of Law  
Over The Accused.**

**To John D. Napper and Glen M. Asay By Asseveration.**

Date: October 25, 2021.

Regarding: Declarant Michael Willis Chase's (hereinafter declarant's /  
asseverant's) Notice and Demand to Cease & Desist to John D. Napper and  
Glen M. Asay from discrimination, conversion, conspiracy, fraud, theft,  
bondage, sedition and overthrow of the American People as agents of foreign  
powers for the purpose of stealing the American People of their birth rights.  
**Notice Is Hereby Given** that Michael Willis Chase, the Accused, demands the

Michael Willis Chase's Demand For Answers To Administrative and Procedural  
Matters Question. And Brief #3 in Support of Demand to Dismiss  
Court, Judges and Prosecutor Who Have No Force of Law  
Over The Accused. Page 1 of 96

1 court to dismiss the charges against this Free and Natural Flesh and Blood Man.  
2 The court, judges and prosecution have no force of law over the Accused. The  
3 Accused denies the court, judges and prosecution jurisdiction. Although the  
4 Accused denies the court jurisdiction, the Accused readily recognizes certain  
5 powers of the court that the court can and does exercise whether jurisdiction is  
6 valid or not. It is the position of the Accused that the trial court, the judges, as  
7 well as, the prosecution is not governmental, in that the de jure has been  
8 dissolved as a matter of law. Therefore, the Accused has no other alternative but  
9 to defend against the loss of Life, Liberty, and Property. The "STATE OF  
10 ARIZONA", in all upper case, is not governmental. It is private, which is causing  
11 runaway tyranny and despotism in the form of police powers, excessive force,  
12 summary judgments, which is creating disgust and animosity between foreigners  
13 private interest, and "We The People" who are not being served by public  
servants. The trial court is not a place of defense against oppression, it is not  
guided by the Constitution of the United States, nor procedural laws in the Bill of  
Rights as the standard of what is reasonable, just, right nor good order based on  
due process, and equal protection under the Law of the Land.

14 ***Notice Is Hereby Given*** that Michael Willis Chase, the Accused, declared  
15 witnessed solemn testimony is not frivolous data, it is logical, knowledgeable,  
16 and reasonable arguments of fact to regain redress of grievances against an  
oppressive foreign power, and it's instruments of cruelty!!!

17 ***Notice Is Hereby Given*** that this Declared Witnessed Testimony is declared  
18 witnessed solemn testimony of Michael Willis Chase by asseveration.  
19 Asseveration being the proof which Michael Willis Chase gives of the evidence  
20 of what I declare by appealing to my conscience as a witness. My Declared  
21 Witnessed Testimony differs from an oath in this: that by the oath, one appeals  
22 to our Creator as a witness of what live humans say and do. The oath invokes  
23 our Creator as the avenger of falsehood and perfidy to punish another if we  
24 speak not the truth. This is commonly known as an "oath of purgation" used in  
the Dark Ages to slaughter pagans.

25 ***Notice Is Hereby Given*** that I, Michael Willis Chase, The Accused has undergone a  
26 *religious conversion*, I do not take oaths or affirmations. The scripture says: **Psalm**

1 116:11 *"I said in my haste, All men are liars"* and Romans 3:4 *"God forbid: yea, let*  
2 *God be true, but every man a liar; as it is written, That thou mightest be justified in*  
3 *thy sayings, and mightest overcome when thou art judged.."* [Read: Gordon verses  
4 *STATE OF IDAHO* 778 F.2d 1397 (1985), -US Ninth Circuit Judge Harry  
5 Pregerson.]

6  
7 *"I'm simply saying that since we've all lied in the past and we've lied*  
8 *once or twice today and we're going to lie in the future, why kid*  
9 *ourselves by saying we tell the truth when in fact we do not. It's my*  
10 *position I would be guilty of perjury the moment I said 'Do you*  
11 *swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so*  
12 *help you God' and I say 'I do' I'm committing a lie."*  
13 *-George Gordon*

14 *Notice Is Hereby Given* that this Notice & Demand is declared witnessed  
15 solemn testimony of Michael Willis Chase by asseveration. Know all these  
16 presents that declarant, Michael Willis Chase does state the following:

- 17 1. *That* declarant is competent to state to the matters set forth herein.
- 18 2. *That* declarant has personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.
- 19 3. *That* all the facts stated herein are true, correct and certain to the best  
20 of declarant's knowledge, are admissible as evidence, and if called upon as  
21 a witnesses, declarant will testify to their veracity.
- 22 4. *That* declarant does state the following facts;

### 23 Introduction.

24 ¶1. COMES NOW the Accused, appearing specially and not generally herein,  
25 for the specific purpose of giving Notice to the Court, and the State, that  
26 neither the agent of the king, nor the Prosecutor, have adequately conferred  
27 jurisdiction in this Court over either the Accused, the subject matter, or the  
28 ability of the Court to affect a remedy. The Accused, Michael Willis Chase, is

1 making a special appearance for myself with assistance counsel of choice  
2 unlicensed; I am NOT making a general appearance as a “defendant” for the  
3 record, I am the “Accused”. who has never granted jurisdiction. I am  
4 challenging jurisdiction granted by Attorneys Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073),  
5 Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney  
6 Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin  
7 Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney  
8 Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) who are degraded,  
9 debased, and subservient to Judges William N. Lundy, then John D. Napper,  
10 then Michael R. Bluff, then Christopher L. Kottke, then back to Michael R.  
11 Bluff, and finally back to John D. Napper.  
12

13 ¶2. The Trial Court appointed Public Defender, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State  
14 Bar#029073), who did nothing to argue for the Accused’s defense. Then the  
15 Accused hired Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363). He  
16 withdrew, recused himself due to conflict of interest. He did nothing in my defense...  
17 The Accused hired Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052). I paid  
18 him \$5,000.00... He did nothing in my defense... I fired him. Then I hired Kevin  
19 Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904). I paid him  
20 \$12,500.00 he did nothing in my defense... He withdrew as my attorney. Then I hired  
21 Attorney Andrew C. Marcantel (State Bar#031809) who reviewed my  
22 paperwork. After I paid him approximately \$8,000.00, he recommended I  
23 *“fake an insanity plea”* to get out of the case. I fired him as my attorney after I  
24 got my files back. Then the Court appointed Nathan Best – Public Defender (State  
25 Bar#032616). Who did nothing for my defense. I filed a Motion, Brief in Support,  
26 and Order titled Motion to Dismiss Public Defender on May 24, 2021 to dismiss  
27

1 Nathan Best... Who did nothing in my defense. To sum it up, all these Attorney's  
2 have debased character of the criminal minds. Being corrupt, debauched, perverted,  
3 reprobate. "White washed tombs", who are crooked, cutthroat, dishonest, unethical,  
4 unprincipled, unscrupulous, evil, immoral, iniquitous, vicious, and wicked... They  
5 are not pure, uncorrupt, nor uncorrupted. They are prostitutes of injustice that have  
6 no dignified, exalted honor and character. The Accused has no respect for them.  
7 From this experience I learned to never trust anyone... Especially Attorneys!!! Now,  
8 I base my relationships on performance not blind trust, which is for fools. The fact is  
9 Attorneys Ruth Szante (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of  
10 MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless  
11 (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley  
12 PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State  
13 Bar#032616) have cheapened, degraded, demeaned, discredited, disgraced,  
14 dishonored, fouled, humbled, humiliated, shamed, and took me down in the Yavapai  
15 County dungeon. These Attorneys confounded, confused, embarrassed, flustered,  
16 mortified, rattled, castigated, depreciated, diminished, disparaged, minimized,  
17 maligned, slandered, condemned, damned, and denounced my wishes to prove that I  
18 was innocent of all charges.

19 ¶3. Deputy Yavapai County Attorneys Kennedy Klagge, then Deputy Yavapai  
20 County Attorney George Rodriguez, and the Accused's first Public Defender Ruth  
21 Szante (State Bar#029073), Accused's first Attorney Zachary Thornley – of  
22 MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), then second Attorney Dennis Bayless – of  
23 Bayless (State Bar#012052), my third Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp &  
24 Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), then my fourth Attorney Andrew C. Marcantel –  
25 Attorneys For Freedom Law Firm (State Bar#031809), and last Nathan Best – Public  
26 Defender (State Bar#032616) have debased character of the criminal mind... Who are  
27

1 soldiers of a given rank, in all ways, subservient to Attorney Judges William N.  
2 Lundy, then John D. Napper, then Michael R. Bluff, then Christopher L.  
3 Kottke, then back to Michael R. Bluff, and finally back to John D. Napper.  
4 These Attorneys salute their superior at every opportunity. They have volunteered  
5 into their subservient relationship with the Judges... They have not been forced into  
6 servitude.

7 ¶4. The Accused was forced into a subservient relationship with all these Attorneys  
8 because of the powerful Judges. First, was William N. Lundy... Who set my bail  
9 at \$500,000 cash. He denied any bond to free me to defend myself in violation  
10 of 8th Amendment United States Constitution: Excessive bail, cruel and  
11 unusual punishment. I was locked-up in jail for approximately 10 months.  
12 Next, was Judge John D. Napper, then Judge Michael R. Bluff, then Judge  
13 Christopher L. Kottke, then back to Judge Michael R. Bluff, and finally back  
14 to Judge John D. Napper... All these Judges controlled my liberty. I was forced  
15 to obey even when I did not want too. This subservience now brings with it a good  
16 dose of resentment, because I kowtowed to the Attorneys just like Uncle Tom and  
17 Josiah Henson, subservient blacks kowtowing to whites, which undermined good  
18 order. My ability to reason was subservient to my desires to be free from their  
19 terrorism... Their barbaric behavior. Their terrorist attacks were partnered with  
20 foreigners abroad, through their “instruments of cruelty” here in the United States,  
21 which forms a national and international network. They are financed by foreign  
22 terrorist organizations, which “shocks the conscious”!... Their violent, criminal acts  
23 are a matter of public record. Their international terroristic barbaric acts is a serious  
24 threat to all Americans. Their domestic terrorism is persistent, overall, with actors  
25 crossing the line from exercising First Amendment – protected rights, by their violent  
26  
27

1 barbaric agendas.

2 ¶5. The factors of their barbaric terrorism contributed to the evolution of lawlessness  
3 threats, duress and coercion on the streets, in their jails, and in their courtrooms. The  
4 Accused's, who is a **"Truth Bomber"**, briefs are designed to expose their barbaric  
5 unjust trade secret tactics. The Accused intends to expose their trade secret to expose  
6 them to thwart these attacks. What makes exposing them difficult is that they are  
7 law enforcement... Supposedly?

8 ¶6. The Accused was an 8404 Hospital Corpsman, and enlisted medical  
9 specialist of the United States Navy. Who also served on United States Marine  
10 Corps Bases, with an honorable discharge dated March 27, 2010.

11 ¶7. The Accused was an 8404 Hospital Corpsman that worked in a wide  
12 variety of capacities and locations. I served shore establishments, naval  
13 hospitals, clinics, and the primary medical caregiver for sailors while  
14 underway.

15  
16 ¶8. The Accused was an 8404 Hospital Corpsman. Who was frequently the  
17 only medical care-giver available in Navy, and Marine units, on active duty.

18 ¶9. The Accused was, in addition, a 8404 Hospital Corpsmen, that performed  
19 duties as assistance in the prevention and treatment of disease, injury, assisting  
20 health care professionals in providing medical care to sailors / Marines, and  
21 their families.

22  
23 ¶10. The Accused was a clinical and/or a specialty technician for medical  
24 administrative personnel, and health care providers at medical treatment  
25 facilities.

26  
27 ¶11. The Accused served as a Field Medical Service Technician Corpsman for

1 the Marine Corps... Who rendered emergency medical treatment to include  
2 initial treatment in a combat environment. A qualified 8404 Hospital  
3 Corpsman may be assigned the responsibility of independent duty aboard ships  
4 and submarines: Fleet Marine Force, S.E.A.L. and Seabee units, and at isolated  
5 duty stations where no medical officer is available.

6 ¶12. The Accused was an 8404 Semper Fidelis Marine Corps Medevac  
7 Corpsman trained at the Naval Hospital Corps School, Great Lakes, Illinois,  
8 and the FMTB-E Field Medical Training Battalion East Camp Lejeune, North  
9 Carolina. Following is the motto for 8404 Corpsmen, *“Where Angels, and*  
10 *Marines fear to Tread, there you’ll find a Corpsman dead.”* The following is  
11 the legal description for Marine Corpsman, *“CORPSMAN – Usually a young,*  
12 *long haired, bearded, Marine-hatin’ Sailor with certain medical skills, who*  
13 *will go through the gates of Hell to get to a wounded Marine.”* This Accused  
14 adds that the YAVAPAI COUNTY JAIL, THIS TRIAL COURT, as well as,  
15 all the Attorneys are “the gates of Hell”!!! This alone is “shocking”!!!  
16

17 ¶13. The Accused’s colloquial form of address for a Hospital Corpsman was  
18 "Doc". In the United States Marine Corps this term is generally used as a sign  
19 of respect.  
20

21 ¶14. The Accused, while in the Yavapai County Jail, was “Shell-Shocked”  
22 being inside their T-DORM psychiatric unit... Sometimes it is called a “locked  
23 ward”. I was being “Shell-Shocked”, which is described as the type of post  
24 traumatic stress disorder inflicted when being attacked. It is the reaction to the  
25 intensity of being bombarded, and fighting for survival, that produces a  
26



1 *“helplessness appearance”*, and attitude of panic of being scared, of flight, as  
2 well as, the inability to reason, sleep, walk or talk according to psychologists.  
3 The truth is the Yavapai County Jail policies and procedures must be named  
4 *“operational exhaustion”*, which are the signature injuries of warfare  
5 responses to traumatic, barbaric, bombardment.

6 ¶15. The Accused experienced symptoms including tinnitus, and  
7 hypersensitivity to noise. I was experiencing physical wounds to my brain  
8 without any head wounds. My suffering came from *“nervous and mental*  
9 *shock”... This is absolute proof of the symptoms suffered by the Accused*  
10 *described as “Manifest Injustice” by Glen M. Asay. (See: Glen M. Asay’s*  
11 *“STATE’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM” dated July 9, 2021 quoting a*  
12 *transcript dated February 23, 2021).* This transcript is the perfect example of  
13 going into “nervous and mental shock”.

14 ¶16. Stated simply, I had symptoms including trauma, fear, anger at myself  
15 for lying...I did not commit a crime!!! There may have been physical damages  
16 to my brain with shock waves from being pepper sprayed, and tasered, that  
17 caused the symptoms which could potentially prove fatal... I was definitely  
18 emotionally injured! All of this was caused due to enemies who “wounded”  
19 me. Now, they are attempting to have me declared “insane” because of my  
20 “unpredictable behavior” caused by fear and trauma. *In my expert opinion, the*  
21 *Yavapai County Jail has a majority of the inmates, consisting of 600 prisoners,*  
22 *who are being medicalized for shell shock by “Haldol”, a major tranquilizer*  
23 *among other drugs!!!*

¶17. The Accused in the County's Jail was a dungeon. I was placed in isolation, nude, slept on a mattress on a concrete floor, with no water, with a shit hole in the floor where I pissed and shit. I begged for water, being dehydrated constantly!!! I never had bottled water in the cell... There was no sink, nor toilet. I would have drank toilet water. I did not see the light of day except five times in 10 months. I had no showers for weeks in T-7 Cell. I was ***“shell shocked”***.

¶18. The Yavapai County medical officials' position is that inmates are psychologically “uninjured”. By drugging the prisoners, the symptoms I witnessed of inmates was a dulled ability to remember much... Their brains would shut-out all the traumatic memories. The Yavapai County Jail amounts to a local ***“Casualty Clearing Station”*** to evacuated inmates to dedicated psychiatric centres, which were set up pending further investigation by medical specialist employed by the jail.

¶19. It is a known fact that, ***“shell shock”*** injuries in the brain areas are responsible for decision making, memory and reasoning. Evidence, by researchers, conclude that changes in behavior is linked to ***“shell shocking”***. It is this Accused opinion that being in jail is like ***“trench warfare”***, and the experience of ***“siege warfare”*** specifically.

¶20. The Accused is going to be put on trail for alleged crimes, which I did not commit. This is being done in a brutal way. The doctors, my attorneys, my public defenders might as well have provided electric shock treatment, extinguish cigarettes out on my tongue, or hot plates at the back of my throat,

1 etc... The Accused will not be obedient to un-lawful commands... I'm  
2 challenging the jurisdiction of the court, the judges, etc.

3 ¶21. This Accused's nervous or mental control provides an honorable  
4 explanation of my supposed "**Plea Bargain**" agreement. I am an expert in the  
5 care of nervous disorders. What this Accused demands is the establishment of  
6 the atmosphere of equal protection under the law, which shows good order, fair  
7 treatment, and which is of the greatest importance. I recognize my case of war  
8 neurosis must be treated on its merits... I have spent the last few months aided  
9 by physical methods, such as: baths, massage, rest of mind and body, which is  
10 essential to my health. I have returned to active life by studying law. I have  
11 regained my capacity to defend myself, even though I'm being attacked.  
12 Something was wrong. I have come back with an attitude for justice to  
13 overcome the attitude of "**Just Us**" by those who have overthrown the state,  
14 and federal de jure governmental systems. I have been damaged. Now, my  
15 course of action is one of patriotic service.

17 ¶22. I had to be careful where I was in the locked ward. I was placed in  
18 isolation, naked, for weeks. I was being placed in a psychiatric ward for the  
19 purpose of breaking my will. As a trained Hospital Corpsmen, I'm an expert  
20 in understanding the symptoms of "battle or combat fatigue", as it is called.  
21 Basically, it is suffering the most serious mental breakdowns from combat.

22 ¶23. The Accused has been in combat, mental distress with the police, the  
23 jailers, the Attorneys, including Attorney Judges first in order William N.  
24 Lundy, then John D. Napper, then Michael R. Bluff, then Christopher L.  
25 Kottke, then back to Michael R. Bluff and finally back to John D. Napper since  
26

1 November 21, 2019. Frankly, this Accused was in hell!!! I am a perfectly safe  
2 flesh and blood human being, who was under attack, which really worked on  
3 my mind, and on my psyche!!! The physical wounds were minor compared to  
4 the psychiatric damage in the locked ward.

5 ¶24. The Accused witnessed the results, first hand, on other prisoners who lost  
6 reality, while being drugged in isolation. In my view, civilians, who are  
7 trained as a neuropsychiatric technologists, had the keys to the locked-ward of  
8 the Yavapai County Jail, which houses 600 patients, and supposedly “all are to  
9 be disturbed patients”. The milder cases, being kept in “open” wards, most  
10 were very young, not very street-wise to the reality of jail life and survival.

11 ¶25. The Accused, when I had a chance, asked: What happened to them?  
12 Where had they been? That is, who of them were lucid enough? Most were so  
13 drugged they couldn’t remember any specifics. They did tell me about being  
14 arrested mainly for resisting arrest. They told me about bloody arrests, being  
15 pepper sprayed, being tasered, and being beaten. Many were being  
16 psychiatrically evaluated for months, and then were sent to other facilities for  
17 treatment.

18 ¶26. The Accused was considered “*a most disturbed patient*” in the locked  
19 ward... Supposedly, I presented a danger to myself and others. I was put in  
20 what is called a “*quiet cell or room*”. A roughly 8-by-10 foot space  
21 containing just a mattress on the cold floor, in the center of the room and a shit  
22 hole in floor for a urinal, and a small window in the door... These are all  
23 examples of violations of *Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails*. Every  
24 half hour a guard walked by to check on this prisoner... They had to be alert to  
25  
26  
27

1 suicide attempts, you see!!! No guard wanted a successful suicide on his or  
2 her watch.

3 ¶27. The Accused asked: How could anyone fight back?.. I asked myself?!!! I  
4 hired Attorneys. This seemed to be my only option. Attorney Andrew C.  
5 Marcantel recommended I *“fake an insanity plea”* to get out of the case, of  
6 course this advice was given after I paid him a \$1,000. In essence, he wanted  
7 me to be a “gold-bricker”. What he said in essence was, I should be unethical,  
8 I should lie to get out of the case!!! I had not lost connection with reality, and I  
9 wasn’t going to fake it. I’m not a liar!!! Although, I am a realist! I was, in  
10 fact, captured by an enemy. I was in fact in their prison. I was, in fact, their  
11 prisoner with no way out!.. I had no remedy!!!

12 ¶28. The Accused recognized the beaten attitudes in jail by the prisoners... For  
13 example: It was like the smell of burnt flesh on wounded pilots. Hospital  
14 Corpsman’s job was to hoist the men into special tubs of water for baths.  
15 “They were in a lot of pain”. Just touching them, they’d scream!!! After  
16 months, they were more than ready to go to the psychiatric ward, Naval  
17 Hospital Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

18 ¶29. The Accused, in jail, was actually in danger... It was “all-out war”!...  
19 This was all-out war!!! Everybody did their part... The police, the jailers,  
20 neuropsychiatric technologists, the Attorney Judges, the Attorney private  
21 prosecutor, my hired attorneys, and the court appointed public defenders...  
22 Who are all culpable for my damages. I was “in the war,” even though I didn’t  
23 start the war, I was still “in the war!” I am not accepting my part in the war. I  
24 am a *“truth bomber”* complaining on the record. As I uncovered the power of  
25  
26  
27

1 taking a chance, pushing the envelope, and ultimately not being afraid of  
2 making my mark!!! I'm dropping **"truth bombs"** on the police, the jailers,  
3 neuropsychiatric technologists, the Attorney Judges, the Attorney private  
4 prosecutor, my hired Attorneys, and the court appointed Attorney public  
5 defenders. In the next few weeks, I will be filing my briefs in support of my  
6 "Demand For Answers to Administrative and Procedural Matters Questions".  
7 I will exposes their Closed Union Shop of Attorneys... I will drop my **"truth**  
8 **bombs"** on the American people, letting them know ***what it's like to survive in***  
9 ***the "dungeon"!!!!*** I intend to expose the truth... to the world!!! My **"Truth**  
10 **Bombs"** are factual!... It is a conspiracy controlling everything! My facts are a  
11 piece of knowledge that, when told to listeners, will be devastating to the  
12 listener's arguments or world views. ***With my truth, being the truth, exposing***  
13 ***the Attorneys' ironic lies... I intend to win this game! In my view, I have***  
14 ***"We The People" on my side!!!! I will win!!!!***

15 ¶30. Being in jail with the psychiatric patients did bother me... It was hard to  
16 believe!!!!... Were the "employees" just doing their jobs?... Were they just  
17 following orders?... I have never seen anything like this!!!!... I wonder about  
18 those young inmate men, from time to time?... What happened to them?

19 ¶31. The Accused, at all times, demands all inalienable perfect rights guaranteed  
20 under the Law of Nations, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of  
21 Confederation, the Constitution of the United States, and the Common Law. This  
22 Accused expressly denies any jurisdictions to include Roman Mercantile, executive  
23 chancery, etc. I only recognize that jurisdiction under the Common Law by this free  
24 and independent inhabitant... Who is a flesh and blood man.

¶32. The Accused alleges that the trial court judges have exclusive responsibility to license Attorneys, which is the court's permission to commit torts, trespasses, and other violations of law against "We The People". The Accused alleges that Attorney judges William N. Lundy, John D. Napper, Michael R. Bluff, Christopher L. Kottke, then back to Michael R. Bluff, and finally, back to John D. Napper have committed felonies involving "immoral turpitude", forgery, fraud, dishonesty, and theft of this Accused's liberty, and his liberty, his resources to defend. Intentionally knowingly, and negligently trespassed me, the Accused. I have experienced actual and potential injuries caused by their criminal actions, which consisted of many aggravating and mitigating factors. Since Attorney Judges William N. Lundy, then John D. Napper, then Michael R. Bluff, then Christopher L. Kottke, then back to Michael R. Bluff and finally back to John D. Napper have exclusive responsibility as the principals for their Attorney agents, under the Law of Agency. They are culpable for their crimes by allowing them to commit torts, torturous acts, trespasses, and other violations of law right in front of them in their courts!!! This alone, "shocks the conscience"!!!

¶33. The Accused, by Declared Witness Testimony, will prove that the "Plea Agreement", was plainly and obviously unjust acceptance under threat, duress, and coercion. The Attorneys fraudulently, through cunning-coercion advised that I lie; that I waive all unalienable perfect rights, which is against all established law; which is opposed to law; which is the test of right and wrong for their "Unjust Enrichment. The attorneys benefitted unfairly to this Accused's misfortune!... This Accused's paid the attorneys who were suppose to take this case to trial, and prove I was innocent. First, they received the benefit of my payment. Second, the Accused suffered losses because of their incompetence, while they benefitted. Third, there was no juristic reason, no legal basis, for the Attorney's benefitting from my being

1 treated unfairly. Treating me like a “Steak on their table by Choice and Consent”, by  
2 treating me as a “Worthless Eater” on Attorney’s alters of injustice is “**Manifest**  
3 **Injustice**”, which this “**Truth Bomber**” intends to expose!!! I will expose the  
4 litigation trade secrets of All Attorneys in this Trial Court.

5 ¶34. The Attorney’s rogue mentality so “shocks the conscience”... This,  
6 “Truth Bomber’s” facts will prove to be “grossly unjust to the observers”!!!  
7 This case is so unjust and wrong that the courts will intervene to provide a  
8 remedy to fix the problem at the federal level. Frankly, this trial court is  
9 broken, which will “shock the conscience” of the upper courts and the jury.  
10 The Attorneys’ egregious, supposedly official conduct, will so “shock the  
11 conscience” that it demands a remedy... It will be just like the “Parable of the  
12 Persistent Woman”.

13 ¶35. The Parable of the Unjust Judge (also known as the Parable of the  
14 Importunate Widow or the Parable of the Persistent Woman, is one of the  
15 parables of Yeshua Ben Yosef, which appears in Luke (Luke 18:1–8). In it, a  
16 judge who lacks compassion is repeatedly approached by a woman seeking  
17 justice. Then Yeshua told his disciples a parable to show them that they  
18 should always pray and not give up. He said:

19  
20  
21 *“In a certain town there was a judge who neither feared God nor*  
22 *cared what people thought. And there was a widow in that town who*  
23 *kept coming to him with the plea, ‘Grant me justice against my*  
*adversary.’*

24 *“For some time he refused. But finally he said to himself, ‘Even*  
25 *though I don’t fear God or care what people think, yet because this*  
26 *widow keeps bothering me, I will see that she gets justice, so that she*  
27 *won’t eventually come and attack me!’”*



1  
2 And the Master said,

3 *“Listen to what the unjust judge says. And will not God bring about*  
4 *justice for his chosen ones, who cry out to him day and night? Will he*  
5 *keep putting them off? I tell you, he will see that they get justice, and*  
6 *quickly. However, when the Son of Man comes, will he find faith on*  
7 *the Earth?”*

8 ¶36. The Accused started mastering due process and equal protection under  
9 the law by studying George Gordon. George Gordon who, in 1982 disgusted  
10 with "Big Brother" encroaching on his business, educated himself, and others,  
11 on law including Courtroom Procedure, and Title 42 lawsuits. He established a  
12 private law school in Boise, “Barristers Inn”, which name was changed to  
13 “George Gordon's School of Common Law”. When he moved to Isabella,  
14 Missouri in 1984, following his patriarchal marriage to Jacqueline, who he  
15 trained in law, and she had 17 cases never losing one. Gordon won 60 legal  
16 cases in the Federal District Court, as well as, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals,  
17 and the Supreme Court. All cases based on religious free exercise. The  
18 scriptures, both Old and New Testaments, were the law of his life and death.  
19 The Accused purpose and intent is to win this case, whether it be in this Trial  
20 Court, or in Federal District Court, or the Federal Appeals Court, or the United  
21 States Supreme Court. This Accused is demanding Answers according to My  
22 Administrative and Procedural Matters Question. One way or another I will  
23 get the answers, and justice, just like the Persistent Woman in the Parable in  
24 Luke 18:1–8.

25  
26 ¶37. The Accused is the **“Truth Bomber”!!!**

1  
2  
3 **Supporting Brief #3 Major Premises.**

4 ¶1. **First major premise** of Michael Willis Chase, the Accused, is that The  
5 “United States of America”, in upper and lower case, is NOT the entity  
6 “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.” a Delaware Corporation, in all  
7 upper case! The “United States”, in upper and lower case, is NOT the entity  
8 “UNITED STATES”, in all upper case! “United States” Attorneys CANNOT  
9 file lawsuits in the name of the “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Inc.”, in all  
10 upper case, which is a Delaware Corporation without Power of Attorney to do  
11 so! *"UNITED STATES Attorneys" are NOT "United States of America*  
12 *Attorneys"*. See: **Attachment A-1**, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.  
13 NON-PROFIT Delaware Corporation Incorporation Date March 19, 1989 File  
14 No. 2193946. The Articles of Confederation are the only origin of the use of  
15 the phrase “United States of America”, in upper and lower case. Free and  
16 Independent States under the Articles of Confederation are styled “Republic of  
17 Arizona” in upper and lower case.

19 ¶2. **Second major premise** of Michael Willis Chase, the Accused, is that “The  
20 State of Arizona”, in upper and lower case, is NOT the entity the “STATE OF  
21 ARIZONA”, in all upper case, see DUN# 10-203-9491, *which is listed as a*  
22 *corporation with Dun and Bradstreet’s credit tracking system as a private*  
23 *business*. “The State of Arizona”, in upper and lower case, is a Sovereignty  
24 with sovereign powers, the entity the “STATE OF ARIZONA”, in all upper  
25 case has no Sovereign powers. “The State of Arizona” Attorneys CANNOT  
26 file lawsuits in the name of the “STATE OF ARIZONA”, DUN# 10-202-9491,  
27

1 without Power of Attorney to do so. “STATE OF ARIZONA Attorneys” are  
2 NOT “The State of Arizona” Attorneys. [See: **Attachment A-2**, *US Corporate*  
3 *State “STATE OF ARIZONA” DUN# 10-202-9491*.

4 ¶3. **Third major premise** of Michael Willis Chase, the Accused, is that “The  
5 State of Arizona” has been replaced By “Federal Corporations presiding Over  
6 TWO Mutually Exclusive and Separate Jurisdictions! The de jure in this case  
7 “The State of Arizona”, in upper and lower case, has been replaced by a Federal  
8 Corporation, the “STATE OF ARIZONA” in all upper case. The “Corporate  
9 States” acts as an “Agency” or “Instrumentality” of the “UNITED STATES  
10 GOVERNMENT”, in all upper case, which is a US Corporation according to  
11 DUN# 052714196. [See: **Attachment A-3**, *DUN# 052714196 for the*  
12 *“UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT”*]. Corp. U.S., which is the “District of  
13 Columbia” trademarked as the name, “United States Government”. This was  
14 done under the constitutional authority for Congress to pass any law within the  
15 ten mile square of the District of Columbia. This “United States Government,  
16 CorpGov or U.S. Inc., is what people call “government”, which is a giant  
17 private CORPORATE MONOPOLY, which violates the Sherman Antitrust  
18 Act, which forces ALL Americans to UNLAWFULLY become its “employee”  
19 or “officer” including Attorney Mark Brnovich as well as all Attorneys in this  
20 case, including yet not limited to Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D.  
21 Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke,  
22 Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, **Attorney** Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney  
23 Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney  
24 Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin  
25  
26  
27

Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616).

¶4. *Fourth major premise* of Plaintiff’s case is that ALL cities and counties in Arizona are publicly traded corporations and businesses traded commercially according to Dunn and Bradstreet who is responsible for keeping records on various publicly traded corporations and businesses.

¶5. *Fifth major premise* of Michael Willis Chase, the Accused, is that the UNITED STATES TREASURY / U.S. TREASURY, INC. Incorporation Date February 8, 1990 File No. 2221617, is a for profit private General Delaware Corporation. It is not governmental.

¶6. An “Organic Act” establishes a government for a territory. The “District of Columbia” is a “Private Corporation” and a “Territory”. It became a PRIVATE Corporation in 1871 by an act of Congress conferring powers of government upon a territory. *In re Lane*, 135 U.S. 443, 10 S. Ct. 760, 34 L. Ed. 219 (1890). See: **Attachment B**, U.S. Supreme Court confirmation.

¶7. This “Organic Act” established a government for a territory created by “The Congress of the Articles of Confederation”, the original jurisdiction Congress set by the “Constitution for the United States of America”. The Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled is a “body politic” and “corporate”, a de jure government, which created a “body corporate”-a “private corporation”, which is NOT a government called the “District of Columbia” a “body corporate” for municipal purposes. A State is “body politic” and “corporate” of “We The People”. See: **Attachment C**, U.S. Supreme Court confirmation.

¶8. States are “bodies politic and corporate”. Why?...just as a corporation is an entity that can act only through its AGENTS, “[t]he State is a political corporate body, which can act only THROUGH AGENTS, and CAN COMMAND ONLY BY LAWS.” *Poindexter verses Greenhow*, supra, 114 U.S., at 288, 5 S.Ct. at 912-913. See *Black’s Law Dictionary* 159 (5th edition 1979) (“[B]ody politic or corporate”: “A social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good”). As a “body politic and corporate,” a State falls squarely within the Dictionary Act’s definition of a “person.” See: **Attachment D**, [*Will verses Michigan Department of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (U.S. Michigan, 1989)], which is U.S. Supreme Court confirmation.

¶9. “Creations By Congress” are NOT necessarily a “Government” unless it is a “Body Politic”, a “Public Entity”, and “De Jure Government”, thus being a Republican State of America! Hence, calling a creation by Congress a “GOVERNMENT” doesn’t MAKE it a “body politic”, a PUBLIC entity, or a de jure government. A “body politic” MUST be REPRESENTED by “We The People” it serves. The District of Columbia corporation doesn’t do this. Rather, as a federal territory, the District of Columbia is organized more akin to a British Crown colony than a republican state of America: See: **Attachment E**, [*Downes verses Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]. U.S. Supreme Court confirmation.

¶10. The “District of Columbia” Is NOT a Government! It is a PRIVATE Municipal Corporation! It is NOT a “body politic” for the people who live

1 *there, they have no representation in Congress like all the other Constitutional*  
2 *States.* The fact that the act creating it as a corporation also called it a  
3 “government” STILL doesn’t make it anything more than a PRIVATE  
4 municipal corporation because said act NEVER expressly identified it as a  
5 PUBLIC corporation nor called it a “body politic”. The formation of a  
6 corporation alone does not “confer political power, political character” and  
7 does NOT form a “body politic”. The creation of a “body politic” within any  
8 act of Congress therefore requires an *express declaration*, which is nowhere  
9 found within the organic act of 1871, 16 Stat. 419, or any subsequent act  
10 affecting the District of Columbia: See: **Attachment F, [Osborn verses Bank**  
11 **of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824)]**, in which the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed this  
12 conclusion.  
13

14 ¶11. The District of Columbia Organic Act of 1871 describes its venue as:  
15 “. . .all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits  
16 of the District of Columbia” according to **22 United States Code §286g:**  
17 Jurisdiction and Venue of Actions. The District of Columbia was originally  
18 provided for in the Constitution for the United States of America (September  
19 17, 1787) at Article 1, Section 8, specifically in the last two clauses. Then, on  
20 July 16, 1790, in accord with the provisions of those clauses, the Territory was  
21 formed in the District of Columbia Act, 1 Stat. 130, wherein the “ten mile  
22 square” territory was permanently created and made the permanent location of  
23 the country’s government. The “**TERRITORY**” includes the actual  
24 government, which also made the President the **CIVIC LEADER** of the local  
25 government in all matters in said Territory and the date for transfer of all  
26  
27

1 offices to this new location was then set at the first Monday in December,  
2 1800.

3 ¶12. On February 27, 1801, 2 Stat. 103-108, under the second District of  
4 Columbia Act, two counties were formed, their respective officers and district  
5 judges were appointed. Three town governments Alexandria, Georgetown and  
6 Washington were recognized as constituted and placed under the laws of the  
7 District, its judges, etc. Then March 3, 1801, 2 Stat. 115-116 a Supplementary  
8 Act to that last Act, added the authority that the Marshals appointed by the  
9 respective District Court Judges collectively form a County Commission with  
10 authority to appoint all officers as may be needed in similarity to the respective  
11 State officials in the states whence the counties Washington and Alexandria  
12 came, being Maryland and Virginia, respectively. According to the United  
13 States Supreme Court those charter acts (first acts) were the official  
14 incorporation of the townships of Alexandria, Georgetown, and Washington  
15 that formed the District of Columbia as chartered by Congress in accord with  
16 the Constitution's provision. See: Cohens vs. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).  
17 Nowhere between 1790 and the Organic Act of 1871, has the U.S. Supreme  
18 Court ever recognized the phrase "District of Columbia" as a corporation by  
19 itself. Since 1801, the Supreme Court called the City of Washington "a  
20 corporation", with the right to sue and be sued. In Cohens vs. Virginia, 19 U.S.  
21 264 (1821): *The "District of Columbia", was not officially and separately*  
22 *recognized as a "corporation" by the courts until after the act of 1871. Some*  
23 *people erroneously try to argue the contrary.* Finally in *The Organic Act of*  
24 *1878*, 20 Stat. 102-108, the District of Columbia was made into a municipal  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 corporation. The Accused searched all rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court  
2 from the beginning, and there is no mention of the phrase “District of  
3 Columbia Organic Act” or “Charter Act of the District of Columbia” or  
4 “incorporation” in reference to the phrase “District of Columbia”. THIS  
5 IS SIMPLY FALSE! Between 1801 and 1871, the term “corporation” is only  
6 used to refer to the *cities* that are geographically within the District of  
7 Columbia, *not* to the “District of Columbia” separately as a “corporation”.

8 ¶13. The first paragraph of the District of Columbia Organic Act of 1871,  
9 follows: “*That all that part of the territory of the United States included within*  
10 *the limits of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a*  
11 *government by the name of the District of Columbia, by which name it is hereby*  
12 *constituted a body corporate for municipal purposes ... and exercise all other*  
13 *powers of a municipal corporation.*” **The Historical Facts Regarding The**  
14 **District Of Columbia Organic Act of 1871: First,** the “corporation” that was  
15 created is not a “**body politic AND corporate**” but simply a “**body**  
16 **corporate**”. It is not a government within the meaning of the original  
17 jurisdiction of the constitution. It is a private, for-profit corporation. **Second,** the  
18 “corporation” was presided over by commissioners appointed by the national  
19 government rather than the people domiciled there through a popular election.  
20 **Third,** the “corporation” is owned by the “United States”, which like all  
21 governments is also a corporation. See: **28 U.S.C. §3002(15)(A)**. See also U.S.  
22 Supreme Court confirmation: **Attachment G, [*Proprietors of Charles River***  
23 ***Bridge verses Proprietors of Warren Bridge*, 36 U.S. 420 (1837)].**

24 ¶14. Corporate rules apply ONLY on its own facilities so long as NOTICE is  
25  
26  
27



1 given. The “government” created in The District Of Columbia Organic  
2 Act of 1871 was the same government any private corporation has within  
3 the operation of its own corporate construct and on its own private land.  
4 *Thus, Plaintiff calls the District of Columbia “Corp. U.S.” The rules of Wal-*  
5 *Mart, apply only on its own facilities so long as notice is given to all who step*  
6 *onto those facilities, then the corporate rules of the landlord apply to all*  
7 *“tenants”.* Congress reserved the right, granted them in the Constitution at  
8 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17, to **COMPLETE DICTATORIAL**  
9 **AUTHORITY** over their **CORP. U.S. CONSTRUCT**, “*The District of*  
10 *Columbia*”, without regard for its internal operations or officers. Thus,  
11 Congress can use it within the ten mile square as they see fit to both govern the  
12 municipality as if it were the municipal government and to use it to do things  
13 the Constitution did not grant them the privilege of doing. *The “District of*  
14 *Columbia” is a private corporation because at the time of its creation: First,*  
15 *there was no “body politic”. The “government” was populated by*  
16 **COMMISSIONERS** appointed by the President rather than  
17 representatives. *Second,* the citizens of the District were not able to elect  
18 **EVERYONE** in the chain of command up to the President. Therefore it is  
19 **NOT** a “representative democracy”. *Later on, the District of Columbia was*  
20 *permitted LIMITED democratic elections, they were and are still presided*  
21 *over by commissioners appointed by the President rather than their own*  
22 *citizens. They continue to be a “BODY CORPORATE” without a true*  
23 *“BODY POLITIC” therefore a PRIVATE corporation.* The U.S. Supreme  
24 Court has identified the nature of this private corporation the “District of  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 Columbia” by identifying it as equivalent to the “national government”. See:  
2 **Attachment H, [National Mutual Insurance Company of District of**  
3 **Columbia versus Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949)].**

4 ¶15. The “United States of America” is NOT the entity “UNITED STATES  
5 OF AMERICA, Inc.” a Delaware Corporation. **The “United States” is NOT**  
6 **the entity “UNITED STATES”. The District of Columbia, “Corp. U.S.”**  
7 **a.k.a. “United States Government”, and the corporate “STATE OF**  
8 **ARIZONA” are Private Foreign Corporations!**

9  
10 ¶16. By 1971, every State government in the union of States had formed such  
11 private corporations (**Corp. States**), in accord with the IMF admonition, *and*  
12 *the people ceased to seat original jurisdiction government officials in their*  
13 *State government seats. One private corporation is called “STATE OF*  
14 *ARIZONA” instead of “Arizona Republic” within corporate registries*  
15 *such as Dunn and Bradstreet. The de jure States of the Union have been*  
16 *replaced by Federal Corporations. The Corporate State, the “STATE OF*  
17 *ARIZONA” consists of federal areas within the exterior limits of the “Arizona*  
18 *Republic”. These areas are federal territory NOT protected by the Constitution*  
19 *of the United States or the Bill of Rights and are “INSTRUMENTALITIES”*  
20 *of the federal government. Jurisdiction over these areas is shared with the*  
21 *federal government. So, now we have Republican “Foreign States”, “Arizona*  
22 *Republic” with respect to the federal government or Corporate State*  
23 *Jurisdiction the de facto “STATE OF ARIZONA” a territory a “Federal*  
24 *Corporation” owned by the Federal Government. This corporate state “THE*  
25 *STATE OF ARIZONA” acts as an “Agency” or “Instrumentality” of the U.S.*  
26  
27

Government assisting in the management and control over federal areas.

¶17. See: **Attachment I**, The history of the District of Columbia and Chronology of some events.

¶18. The corporate state “**THE STATE OF ARIZONA**” consists of federal areas within the exterior limits of the de jure “Arizona”. These areas are federal territory not protected by the Constitution of the United States or the Bill of Rights they are “**INSTRUMENTALITIES**” of the federal government. Jurisdiction over these areas is shared with the federal government under the auspices of the following supposed legal authorities. ***First***, the **Buck Act**, codified at 4 U.S.C. §108-116. ***Second***, the **Assimilated Crimes Act**, codified at 18 U.S.C. §13. ***Third***, the **Rules of Decision Act**, codified at 28 U.S.C. §1652. This act prescribes which of the two conflicting laws shall prevail in the case of crimes on federal territory. ***Fourth***, Title 28 U.S.C. §2679, which says that any action against an officer or employee of the United States in which the officer or employee is acting outside their authority may be prosecuted in a state court and is not a “federal question”. ***Fifth***, an ***Agreement on Coordination of Tax Administration*** (ACTA) between the de facto “STATE OF ARIZONA” and the Secretary of the Treasury of the IMF and World Bank. ***The situation above in respect to a state is not unlike the national government, which has TWO mutually exclusive jurisdictions:*** See: **Attachment J**, [*Cohens verses Virginia*, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265; 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)] and [*Downes verses Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)].

¶19. The hard part is figuring out, which of the TWO JURISDICTIONS that any particular state statute or law applies to, the de jure Republic “Foreign

1 State” “The State of Arizona” jurisdiction or the corporate state de facto “THE  
2 STATE OF ARIZONA” jurisdiction. What makes this process difficult are the  
3 following complicating factors: ***First***, *there is no constitutional requirement*  
4 *that the laws passed by the state legislature must clearly state which of the two*  
5 *jurisdiction they apply to. ***Second***, crafty state legislators deliberately obfuscate*  
6 *the laws they write so as to encourage those within the Republic to obey laws*  
7 *that in fact only apply to the corporate state “THE STATE OF ARIZONA” so*  
8 *as to unlawfully increase their revenues, power, and control. ***Third***, Courts of*  
9 *INjustice and the commissioners, called judges, who serve in them refuse to*  
10 *acknowledge that most statutes passed by the legislature can only lawfully*  
11 *affect federal areas and “We The People” who consent to be treated as though*  
12 *they inhabit these areas. Within federal law, the Republic portion of each state*  
13 *“The State of Arizona” in this case, is referred to as a “foreign state”. To wit:*  
14 *“Foreign states. Nations, which are outside the United States. Term may also*  
15 *refer to another state; i.e. a sister state.” [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth*  
16 *Edition, page 648]. Even the U.S. Supreme Court admits that the Republic*  
17 *portion of states, “The State of Arizona” in this case, of the Union is a*  
18 *“foreign state” with respect to the federal government: See: Attachment K,*  
19 *[81A Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), United States, §29 (2003)], [19 Corpus*  
20 *Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), Corporations, §884 (2003)], and [State of Minnesota*  
21 *vs. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499 (1901)].*

22  
23 ¶20. *The U.S. Supreme Court recognized ALL TERRITORIES CONSTITUTE*  
24 *“corporations”, which implies that they are federal corporations OWNED by*  
25 *federal government. See: Attachment L, [Ngiraingas verses Sanchez, 495*  
26  
27

1 U.S. 182 (1990)].

2 ¶21. *The Corporate State, “THE STATE OF ARIZONA” essentially acts as*  
3 *an AGENCY or INSTRUMENTALITY of the United States Government*  
4 *DUN# 052714196, assisting in the management and control over federal*  
5 *areas.* This agency [*The Corporate State*] is created by an *Agreement on*  
6 *Coordination of Tax Administration* (ACTA) agreement between the  
7 corporate “STATE OF ARIZONA” and the *United States Government DUN#*  
8 *052714196*, and it represents a delegation of authority by the *United States*  
9 *Government DUN# 052714196* to allow the de facto state government to  
10 enforce their taxes and laws ONLY within the Corporate “STATE OF  
11 ARIZONA” and the federal areas within the exterior limits of “THE STATE  
12 OF ARIZONA” which comprise it. *The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that*  
13 *corporate charters are nothing more than contracts between the officers of the*  
14 *corporation and the government granting the franchise, which in the case of*  
15 *the ACTA [Agreement on Coordination of Tax Administration] agreements is*  
16 *the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DUN# 052714196, when it said:*

17  
18 *The court held that the first company's charter was a contract*  
19 *between it and the state, within the protection of the constitution of the*  
20 *United States, and that the charter to the last company was therefore*  
21 *null and void., Mr. Justice DAVIS, delivering the opinion of the court,*  
22 *said,*

23 *“...that, if anything was settled by an unbroken chain of decisions*  
24 *in the federal courts, it was that an act of incorporation was a*  
25 *contract between the state and the STOCKHOLDERS...”*

26 [Note: the stockholders are NOT officers of the de jure state  
27 government. They are “officer of the corporation” including

1 Attorney Mark Brnovich, Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney  
2 John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney  
3 Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney Glen M. Asay, Attorney Ruth  
4 Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of  
5 MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis  
6 Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney  
7 Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State  
8 Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender  
9 (State Bar#032616)].

10 *'a departure from which now would involve dangers to society that*  
11 *cannot be foreseen, would shock the sense of justice of the country,*  
12 *unhinge its business interests, and weaken, if not destroy, that*  
13 *respect which has always been felt for the judicial department of the*  
14 *government.'*

15 *[New Orleans Gas Co. verses Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650*  
16 *(1885)].*

17 ¶22. The “stockholders” the Supreme Court are talking about above are  
18 officers of a private corporation, not officers of the state government, the de  
19 jure “The State of Arizona”!!! Attorney Mark Brnovich, Attorney William N.  
20 Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney  
21 Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney Glen M. Asay, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State  
22 Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar  
23 #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052),  
24 Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904),  
25 and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616), are  
26 *assimilated* into the “UNITED STATES”, in all upper case, a private federal  
27 corporation by virtue of FRAUDULENTLY participating in the “trade or  
28 business” franchise created within federal areas of the state, “The State of

1 Arizona” de jure, by the *Buck Act* and the *Public Salary Tax Act*. Federal areas  
2 within the exterior limits of the de jure states of the Union “The State of  
3 Arizona” the de jure state government therefore CONVERTING and qualifying  
4 as “***POSSESSIONS***” of the “UNITED STATES” upon execution of the *ACTA*  
5 *agreement [Agreement on Coordination of Tax Administration]*, and therefore  
6 “States”, in this case “THE STATE OF ARIZONA” is within federal law  
7 according to: ***TITLE 4, CHAPTER 4, §110. §110. Same; definitions. (d) The***  
8 ***term “State” includes any Territory or possession of the United States. See:***  
9 ***Attachment M, [Request for Return/Information. Form 8796]. Form 8796,***  
10 ***Request for Returns/Information (Federal/State Tax Exchange Program), is***  
11 ***used by either IRS or employees of state tax agencies to request returns and/or***  
12 ***return information in accordance with an approved Agreement on***  
13 ***Coordination of Tax Administration*** (basic agreement). Use of this form is  
14 encouraged but not mandatory. When Form 8796, Request for  
15 Returns/Information (Federal/State Tax Exchange Program) is used, sections C  
16 and D are signed by officials who are authorized to make requests and/or  
17 release information under the terms of the basic and implementing agreements.  
18 The term “possession” is nowhere defined in the law that Plaintiff has been able  
19 to locate. However, Black’s Law Dictionary indicates that all “rights” or  
20 franchises constitute “property”. See: ***Attachment N***, legal definition of  
21 property.  
22

23 ¶23. According to 18 U.S.C. §219: Officers and employees acting as agents of  
24 foreign principals, Mark Brnovich as well as Attorney William N. Lundy,  
25 Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher  
26  
27

1 L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073),  
2 Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363),  
3 Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney  
4 Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and  
5 Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616), all those  
6 Attorneys, have destroyed the Constitutional taxing power by redistributing  
7 “We The People’s” wealth to FOREIGN PRINCIPALS, as “Officers” and  
8 “Employees” who are “Agents” of foreign principals. The U.S. Supreme Court  
9 has said that when an AGENT of the government exceeds his authority under  
10 the law, then he is acting as a “private individual” rather than a “public  
11 official”. See: **Attachment O**, [*Poindexter verses Greenhow*, 114 U.S. 270,  
12 5 S. Ct. 903 (1885)]. They have destroyed the Constitutional taxing power by  
13 redistributing “We The People’s” wealth to FOREIGN PRINCIPALS, as  
14 “Officers” and “Employees” who are “Agents” of foreign principals, which is  
15 ROBBERY. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the ONLY purpose for  
16 lawful, constitutional taxation is to collect revenues to support ONLY the  
17 machinery and operations of the de jure government and its “employees”. This  
18 purpose, it calls a “public use” or “public purpose”. See: **Attachment P**,  
19 [*Loan Association verses Topeka*, 20 Wall. 655 (1874)]; [*U.S. verses Butler*,  
20 297 U.S. 1 (1936)]; Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “public purpose”,  
21 “public use” and “tax”.

22  
23 ¶24. Attorney Mark Brnovich, Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D.  
24 Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke,  
25 Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney  
26  
27



1 Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney  
2 Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin  
3 Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney  
4 Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) are Attorneys for the  
5 “Corporate State” “THE STATE OF ARIZONA”, in all caps, are “Agents”  
6 and “Instrumentalities” are “Officer” and “Employee” of the **UNITED**  
7 **STATES GOVERNMENT DUN# 052714196** according to **18 U.S.C. §912**  
8 and agents of foreign principals according to **18 U.S.C. §219**. They DO NOT  
9 conduct prosecutions in the name of Arizona according to the Arizona  
10 Constitution adopted December 9, 1910 “The Constitution of the State of  
11 Arizona”, in upper and lower case. According to Article VI. Judicial  
12 Department Section 25, “The style of process shall be “**The State of**  
13 **Arizona**”, and prosecutions shall be conducted in the name of the state and by  
14 its authority”.

16 ¶25. The corporatization and privatization of the de jure Arizona has occurred.  
17 “The State of Arizona”, spelled in upper and lower case, has been  
18 OVERTHROWN using a private corporation called “THE STATE OF  
19 ARIZONA”, spelled in all upper case, which is a de facto separate jurisdiction.  
20 Writs and process are now only issued out of federal commercial state districts  
21 called “this state,” “THE STATE OF ARIZONA”, spelled in upper and lower  
22 case. The sovereign Arizona judiciary right to issue writs and process in the  
23 name of the lawful collective of “We The People’s” the de jure body politic and  
24 corporate body “The State of Arizona”, spelled in upper and lower case, has  
25 been **OVERTHROWN**, **18 U.S.C. §2385**, by Mark Brnovich’s state wide  
26

1 Attorneys including Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper,  
2 Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen*  
3 *M. Asay*, **Attorney** Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary  
4 Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis  
5 Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of  
6 Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best –  
7 Public Defender (State Bar#032616) in **Seditious CONSPIRACY** against “We  
8 The People’s” rights, **18 U.S.C. §241** and **18 U.S.C. §2384** who are committing  
9 **TREASON, 18 U.S.C. §2381**, by the use of a privatized state as “officers” and  
10 “employees”.  
11

12 ¶26. According to **18 U.S.C. §219**: Officers and employees acting as agents of  
13 foreign principals, Mark Brnovich as well as Attorney William N. Lundy,  
14 Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher  
15 L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073),  
16 Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363),  
17 Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney  
18 Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and  
19 Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616), have given up  
20 their freedom by contracting away their birthright with the **UNITED STATES**  
21 **OF AMERICA, INC.** NON-PROFIT Delaware Corporation Incorporation  
22 Date April, 19th 1989 File No. 2193946, spelled in all upper case. This  
23 corporation is foreign owned by the IMF, which is a conflict of interest between  
24 the National Government and **UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.,**  
25 **which is a fraud!!!**  
26  
27

¶27. They are **AGENTS OF FOREIGN PRINCIPALS** liable for their acts, to their principals; and to third persons. When Attorney Mark Brnovich as well as Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) DO NOT disclose their agency they are acting for themselves as principals. They are agents and factors, acting for merchants of **FOREIGN COUNTRIES** liable whether they disclose their principal or not, this being the usage of the trade. They are negligent in law, by a long chain of causation, liable for their actions. **See: Attachment Q; Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856 Edition regarding Agents.**

¶28. “The State of Arizona” de jure has been OVERTHROWN first and foremost by Mark Brnovich, who is at the helm of approximately 400 Attorneys and 1,000 employees who are ALL “citizens of the United States”. He has supervisory powers over ALL county Attorneys who are ALL state bar members who prosecute and defend ALL proceeding in ALL de facto courts of the “Corporate State” “STATE OF ARIZONA”, spelled in all caps, in direct violation of The Constitution of “The State of Arizona” at

“§25. Style of process; conduct of prosecution in the name of state, Section 25. The style of process shall be “The State of Arizona”, and prosecutions shall be conducted in the name of the state and by its authority.”

1 Attorney Mark Brnovich as well as Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John  
2 D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke,  
3 Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney  
4 Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney  
5 Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin  
6 Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney  
7 Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) are guilty of Federal crimes  
8 of ***TREASON 18 U.S.C. §2381: SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY 18 U.S.C.***  
9 ***§2384; and ADVOCATING THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT***  
10 ***18 U.S.C. §2385.*** Mark Brnovich directs, controls, and (pays in foreign “bills of  
11 credit”) 400 Attorneys and 1,000 employees as their chief legal officer,  
12 supposedly the head of the “Arizona Department of Law”. He is in FRAUD of  
13 the constitutionally-established office of “The State of Arizona”, spelled in  
14 upper and lower case. He is the “U.S. Corporate State” “STATE OF  
15 ARIZONA”, spelled in all upper case, DUN # 10-202-9491, (largest law firm in  
16 Arizona). Attorney Mark Brnovich as well as Attorney William N. Lundy,  
17 Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher  
18 L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073),  
19 Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363),  
20 Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney  
21 Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and  
22 Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) are “Agents” and  
23 “Instrumentalities” of the corporate “U.S. GOVERNMENT”, spelled in all  
24 upper case, DUN # 052714196, as well as foreign principals who have  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 *OVERTHROWN* “We The People’s de jure government”! [See: *Attachment A-*  
2 *I*, US Corporate State “STATE OF ARIZONA”, spelled in all upper case,  
3 DUN# 10-202-9491].

4 ¶29. “Distinguishing between the public and governmental acts of sovereign  
5 states on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other is not  
6 a novel approach.” *Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. verses Cuba*, 425 U.S. 682.  
7

8 “‘When a state enters the market place seeking customers it divests  
9 itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of  
10 a trader ...’ ‘there is a constitutional line between the State as  
11 government and the State as trader ...’”

12 *New York verses United States*, 226 U.S. 572, 579 (1940); *California verses*  
13 *Taylor*. 353 U.S. 553, 564 (1957); *United States verses California*, 297 U.S.  
14 175, 183 (1936).

15 ¶30. Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael  
16 R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney Glen M. Asay,  
17 Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of  
18 MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless  
19 (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp &  
20 Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender  
21 (State Bar#032616) are at war with “We The People”. This premise asks this  
22 question. Can Michael Willis Chase as an inferior, prosecute or punish Attorney  
23 William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and  
24 Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney Glen M. Asay, Attorney Ruth Szanto  
25 (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State  
26  
27

1 Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as  
2 SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State  
3 Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616),  
4 as a superior? Generally speaking, not while they are his superior. Yet to resist  
5 force with force, being the “state of war”, levels the parties, cancels all former  
6 relation of reverence, respect, and superiority; then the odds that remains are  
7 that he, who opposes the unjust aggressor, has this superiority over Attorney  
8 William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and  
9 Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto  
10 (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State  
11 Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as  
12 SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State  
13 Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616)  
14 as a superior who have “un-superior” themselves. The Accused can never  
15 come by a power over them UNLESS he does something that makes them cease  
16 to be Public Official; for then they divest themselves of any office and dignity,  
17 and returns to the state of a private man or woman, and “We The People”  
18 become free and superior. The power devolving to “We The People” again.

19  
20 ¶31. Michael Willis Chase, the Accused, alleges that the de facto Attorney  
21 William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and  
22 Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto  
23 (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of Mayes Telles PLLC (State  
24 Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as  
25 SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State  
26  
27

1 Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616),  
2 ipso facto, became NO Public Officials, and lost all power and authority over  
3 “We The People” for the following causes: ***First***, because Attorney William N.  
4 Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney  
5 Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State  
6 Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar  
7 #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052),  
8 Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904),  
9 and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) have  
10 OVERTHROWN THE DE JURE GOVERNMENT; that is; they have a  
11 purpose and design to ruin the de jure government; that they have openly  
12 declares by their actions that they would be NO longer be loyal to “We The  
13 People”; and that they have it in their thoughts cut off “We The People”; and  
14 they wish that “We The People” had but one neck that they might dispatch  
15 them all at a blow. Their attitudes have designs and thoughts that seriously  
16 promote that; they immediately gives up all care and thought of “We The  
17 People”, and, consequently, forfeits the power of governing “We The People”,  
18 the “body politic”. ***Second***, when Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John  
19 D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke,  
20 Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney  
21 Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney  
22 Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin  
23 Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney  
24 Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) make themselves the  
25  
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27  
28

1 dependent of foreigners, and subjects “We The People” to them, the power and  
2 authority put into their hands is dissolved by their ***DOMINION*** being placed in  
3 the hands of ***FOREIGNERS***. Their actions prejudice “We The People”. They  
4 have hereby lost the principal part of their power and authority because they  
5 ***BETRAYED*** and ***FORCED*** “We The People” ***to lose liberty*** that they ought to  
6 have carefully preserved; instead they have empowered the domination of  
7 foreigners. By this, as it were, Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D.  
8 Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke,  
9 Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney  
10 Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney  
11 Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin  
12 Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney  
13 Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) have ***alienated*** this country.  
14 They have lost any power they had in their country before; and so, by their acts,  
15 they set “We The People” free and leaves “We The People” at there own  
16 disposal. In this case Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper,  
17 Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen*  
18 *M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary  
19 Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis  
20 Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of  
21 Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best –  
22 Public Defender (State Bar#032616) MUST be resisted, as they ceased to be  
23 Governmental. They are ***rogue***, for where so ever the authority ceases, the  
24 Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R.



1 Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney  
2 Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles  
3 PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar#  
4 as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC  
5 (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State  
6 Bar#032616) ceases too! They becomes like other men and women who have  
7 **NO authority.**

8 ¶32. Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael  
9 R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney  
10 Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles  
11 PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar#  
12 as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC  
13 (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State  
14 Bar#032616) have **dethroned** themselves, and put themselves in a state of war  
15 with “We The People”, there is nothing that shall hinder “We The People” from  
16 prosecuting those who are **NOT Public Officials**, as “We The People” would  
17 any other man or woman, who has put themselves into a state of war with “We  
18 The People”. This is reasonable in particular cases of private men and women,  
19 why should it be otherwise where Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John  
20 D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke,  
21 Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, Attorney Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney  
22 Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney  
23 Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin  
24 Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney  
25  
26  
27

1 Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) endangered the health,  
2 safety and welfare of ALL Americans. Their evil actions, if not prevented, are  
3 greater, and the redress very difficult and dangerous if not stopped by “We The  
4 People”.

5 ¶33. The U.S. Supreme Court “**Sovereign Acts Doctrine**” distinguishes in any  
6 given situation whether a government is: 1. Acting in its sovereign capacity as a  
7 “government”, thereby entitled to sovereign immunity. 2. Acting in its private  
8 capacity essentially as a corporation in equity. The Court has defined the  
9 “*Sovereign Acts Doctrine*” as a means to determine which two capacities apply  
10 in any given situation. *Understanding this doctrine is important: Is the*  
11 *government acting as a PRIVATE CORPORATION, for foreign private*  
12 *interests, or a DE JURE GOVERNMENT?*

13 ¶34. No one is permitted to operate corruptly and safely behind “**sovereign**  
14 **immunity**” laws. No one is immune from justice over “We The People’s”  
15 Constitutional guarantees: Title 42 United States Code §1983. “Civil action  
16 for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any statute,  
17 ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or  
18 causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within  
19 the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or  
20 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party  
21 injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for  
22 redress.”  
23  
24  
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1       *"The innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of governmental*  
2       *authority is assured that he will be compensated for his injury." Owen*  
3       *verses City of Independence*, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980).

4       ¶35. U.S. Supreme Court has held that when the federal corporation called  
5       "United States" enters into private business, it takes on the character of any  
6       other *private* corporation: (See: **Attachment R, Murray verses City of**  
7       **Charleston**, 96 U.S. 432 (1877).

8       ¶36. U.S. Supreme Court said when an AGENT of government exceeds his  
9       authority under law, he is acting as a "private individual" rather than a "public  
10      official". (See: **Attachment O, Poindexter verses Greenhow**, 114 U.S. 270, 5  
11      S. Ct. 903 (1885).

12      ¶37. Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael  
13      R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*,  
14      **Attorney** Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of  
15      MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless  
16      (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp &  
17      Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender  
18      (State Bar#032616) are "de facto government employees", and especially those  
19      within the IRS and the federal judiciary, blatantly, frequently, and with  
20      *impunity* exceed the constitutional and statutory limitations upon their conduct.  
21      Consequently, they cease to represent the de jure government and are acting  
22      merely as "private individuals" within what amounts to a "sham trust" that  
23      started out as a "public trust" and was transformed by usurpers into a private,  
24      for-profit, corporate monopoly: (See: **Attachment S, U.S. ex. rel. Brookfield**  
25      **Const. Co. verses Stewart**, 284 F. Supp. 94 (1964).

¶38. Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, **Attorney** Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) are agents of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC., spelled in all capital letters, a NON-PROFIT Delaware Corporation Incorporation Date April, 19, 1989 File No. 2193946, paid in Federal Reserve notes, being debt obligations of their principal, the IMF their **FOREIGN PRINCIPAL**.

¶39. The dissolved governmental structure is actually a Private De Facto PRIVATE CORPORATION, not a government formed by “We The People”. The De Facto CORPORATION is a corporation formed by corporations. Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke, Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, **Attorney** Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) are AGENTS of Private De Facto CORPORATION(S) who have **NO IMMUNITY**. (See: **Attachment T, *Spooner verses McConnell*, 22 F. 939, 943; *Julliard verses Greenman*: 110 U.S. 421, (1884).**

1 ¶40. Michael Willis Chase, the Accused, alleges that ANYTHING that converts  
2 PRIVATE property or PRIVATE rights of “We The People” into PUBLIC  
3 rights or PUBLIC OFFICES or franchises accomplishes a purpose OPPOSITE  
4 that for which governments are created by “We The People” and hence,  
5 constitutes PRIVATE business activity that cannot and will not be protected  
6 with sovereign immunity.

7 ¶41. Private business activities by Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John  
8 D. Napper, Attorney Michael R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke,  
9 Attorney *Glen M. Asay*, **Attorney** Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney  
10 Zachary Thornley – of MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney  
11 Dennis Bayless – of Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin  
12 Crowley – of Lane, Hupp & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney  
13 Nathan Best – Public Defender (State Bar#032616) serve the interest of  
14 **FOREIGN PRINCIPALS**, which is not governmental, even if it is attempted  
15 by a government officer acting under the “color of law”, it is STILL not  
16 “government activity” that can be protected by **SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY**, but  
17 is mere PRIVATE business activity that operates at the same level as ANY  
18 OTHER business must as a matter of equity. (See: **Attachment U, *United***  
19 ***States verses Winstar Corp.*, 518 U.S. 839 (1996).**

21 ¶42. Attorney William N. Lundy, Attorney John D. Napper, Attorney Michael  
22 R. Bluff, and Attorney Christopher L. Kottke **having entered the domain of**  
23 **commerce with other, including but not limited to** Attorney *Glen M. Asay*,  
24 **Attorney** Ruth Szanto (State Bar#029073), Attorney Zachary Thornley – of  
25 MayesTelles PLLC (State Bar #032363), Attorney Dennis Bayless – of  
26

1 Bayless (State Bar# as SBN012052), Attorney Kevin Crowley – of Lane, Hupp  
2 & Crowley PLC (State Bar#023904), and Attorney Nathan Best – Public  
3 Defender (State Bar#032616) **are co-conspirators, having no *sovereign***  
4 ***immunity*, by coming down from any position of sovereignty, the co-**  
5 **conspirators are the proximate cause of their own injuries! The major**  
6 **premise of this case is: Michael Willis Chase is not dealing with a**  
7 **“government”. It has been dissolved as a matter of law, it is a private**  
8 **corporation and franchise directed, controlled and financed by foreign**  
9 **“employers” in which the “co-conspirators” are just “employees” of the**  
10 ***private pseudo-government corporation* who have no choice but to do**  
11 **exactly and only what they are commanded to do through *CORPORATE***  
12 ***POLICY* disguised to “look” like *PUBLIC LAW* but which in actuality is**  
13 **just *SPECIAL LAW* or *PRIVATE LAW* that is part of their employment**  
14 **agreements.**

#### 16 17 **Table of Contents - Attachments**

18 **Attachment A-1.** UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC. NON-PROFIT  
19 Delaware Corporation Incorporation Date March 19, 1989 File No. 2193946.

20 **Attachment A-2.** US Corporate State “STATE OF ARIZONA” DUN#  
21 068300170.

22 **Attachment A-3.** US Corporate State “United States Government” DUN#  
23 052714196.

24  
25 **Attachment B. *Tharp verses Blake*, Tex. Civ. App., 171 38 S.W. 549, 550;**  
26 **Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pages 1251-1251. Organic Law; Quote**  
27 **from Statutes at Large, 16 Stat. 419 (1871).**

1  
2 **Attachment C.** U.S. Supreme Court Decisions that Determine “What Is a  
3 State?”

4 **Attachment D.** *U.S. Supreme Court Decision, Will verses Michigan*  
5 *Department of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (U.S.Mich.,1989).

6 **Attachment E.** *U.S. Supreme Court Decision, Downes verses Bidwell*, 182  
7 U.S. 244 (1901).

8 **Attachment F.** U.S. Supreme Court Decision, Osborn verses Bank of U.S., 22  
9 *U.S. 738 (1824)*.

10 **Attachment G.** *U.S. Supreme Court Decision, Proprietors of Charles River*  
11 *Bridge verses Proprietors of Warren Bridge*, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).

12 **Attachment H.** *U.S. Supreme Court Decision, National Mutual Insurance*  
13 *Company of District of Columbia verses Tidewater Transfer Co.*, 337 U.S.  
14 582 (1949).

15 **Attachment I.** The History of the District of Columbia And Chronology of  
16 Some Events.

17 **Attachment J.** *Cohens verses Virginia*, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265; 5 L.Ed.  
18 257 (1821); and *Downes verses Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).

19  
20 **Attachment K.** *State of Minnesota verses Brundage*, 180 U.S. 499 (1901).

21  
22 **Attachment L.** *Ngiraingas verses Sanchez*, 495 U.S. 182 (1990).

23 **Attachment M.** Form 8796 Returns Information, Fed State Tax Exchange  
24 Program

25 **Attachment N.** Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1216]. Property  
26 defined.

1 **Attachment O. *Poindexter verses Greenhow*, 114 U.S. 270, 5 S. Ct. 903**  
2 **(1885).**

3 **Attachment P. *Loan Association verses Topeka*, 20 Wall. 655 (1874)];**  
4 ***U.S. verses Butler*, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Black’s Law Dictionary definition of**  
5 **“public purpose”, “public use” and “tax”.**

6 **Attachment Q. Quote, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856 Edition.**

7 **Attachment R. *Murray verses City of Charleston*, 96 U.S. 432 (1877);**  
8 **“Corpus Juris Secundum”**

9 **Attachment S. *U.S. ex. rel. Brookfield Const. Co. verses Stewart*, 284 F.**  
10 **Supp. 94 (1964).**

11 **Attachment T. *Spooner verses McConnell*, 22 F. 939, 943; Julliard verses**  
12 **Greenman: 110 U.S. 421, (1884).**

13 **Attachment U. *United States verses Winstar Corp.*, 518 U.S. 839 (1996);**  
14 ***Clearfield Trust Co. verses United States*, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943).**  
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Attachment A-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC., spelled in all upper case, which is a  
NON-PROFIT Delaware Corporation Incorporation Date  
March 19, 1989 File No. 2193946.

State of Delaware  
The Official Website for the First State

Visit the Governor | General Assembly | Courts | Other Elected C  
elp | Search Delaware:   Citizen Serv

Division of Corporations

[Frequently Asked Questions](#) [View Search Results](#)

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Entity Details

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**THIS IS NOT A STATEMENT OF GOOD STANDING**

<a href="#">File Number:</a>	4525682	<a href="#">Incorporation Date</a> <a href="#">/ Formation Date:</a>	04/14/2008 (mm/dd/yyyy)
<a href="#">Entity Name:</a>	THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.		
<a href="#">Entity Kind:</a>	CORPORATION	<a href="#">Entity Type:</a>	GENERAL
<a href="#">Residency:</a>	DOMESTIC	State:	DE

---

[REGISTERED AGENT INFORMATION](#)

Name:	SPIEGEL & UTRERA, P.A.		
Address:	9 EAST LOOCKERMAN STREET SUITE 3A		
City:	DOVER	County:	KENT
State:	DE	Postal Code:	19901
Phone:	(302)744-9800		

1 The Articles of Confederation established a corporation called “The United  
2 States of America”, spelled in upper and lower case, which was identified by the  
3 U.S. Supreme Court as follows:

4 *[United States verses Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936)].*

5  
6 *“As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies, acting*  
7 *as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not*  
8 *to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and*  
9 *corporate capacity as the United States of America. Even before the*  
10 *Declaration, the colonies were a unit in foreign affairs, acting through a*  
11 *COMMON AGENCY-namely, the Continental Congress, composed of*  
12 *delegates from the thirteen colonies. That agency exercised the powers of*  
13 *war and peace, raised an army, created a navy, and finally adopted the*  
14 *Declaration of Independence. Rulers come and go; governments end and*  
15 *forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A POLITICAL*  
16 *SOCIETY CANNOT ENDURE [299 U.S. 304, 317] WITHOUT A*  
17 *SUPREME WILL SOMEWHERE. SOVEREIGNTY IS NEVER HELD*  
18 *IN SUSPENSE. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of Great Britain*  
19 *in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the Union.*

20  
21 *(See Penhallow verses Doane, 3 Dall. 54, 80, 81, Fed. Cas. No. 10925).*

22  
23 *That fact was given practical application almost at once. The Treaty of Peace, made*  
24 *on September 3, 1783, was concluded between his Brittanic Majesty and the*  
25 *'United States of America.' 8 Stat., European Treaties, 80.*

26  
27 *“The Union existed BEFORE the Constitution, which was ordained and*  
28 *established among other things to form 'a more perfect Union.' Prior to*  
29 *that event, it is clear that the Union, declared by the Articles of*  
30 *Confederation to be 'PERPETUAL,' was the sole possessor of*  
31 *EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY, and in the Union it remained without*  
32 *change save in so far as the Constitution in express terms QUALIFIED*  
33 *its exercise. The Framers' Convention was called and exerted its powers*  
34 *upon the irrefutable postulate that though the states were several their*  
35 *people in respect of foreign affairs were one.”*

1  
2 *[United States verses Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936)].*  
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## Company Details

Name & Registered Office:

**THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LIMITED**

THE WHITE HOUSE

78 MONTGOMERY STREET

EDINBURGH

LOTHIAN

SCOTLAND

EH7 5JA

Company No. SC380798

**Status:** Active

**Date of Incorporation:** 22/06/2010

**Country of Origin:** United Kingdom

**Company Type:** Private Limited Company

**Nature of Business (SIC):**

9900 - Extra-territorial organisations

## Attachment A-2

*US Corporate State "STATE OF ARIZONA", spelled in all upper case, DUN# 068300170, is listed as a private corporation with Dun and Bradstreet's credit tracking system as a private business, which is not governmental, which is not sovereign.*

<i>State</i>	<i>DUN #</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>DUN #</i>
State of Alabama	004027553	City of Birmingham	074239450
State of Alaska	078198983	City of Fairbanks	079261830
State of Arizona	068300170	City of Phoenix	030002236
State of Arkansas	619312569	City of Little Rock	065303794
State of California	071549000	City of Los Angeles	159166271
State of Colorado	076438621	City of Denver	066985480
State of Connecticut	016167285	City of Bridgeport	156280596
State of Delaware	037802962	City of Wilmington	067393900
District of Columbia	949056860	City of Washington	073010550
State of Florida	004078374	City of Miami	965299576
State of Georgia	069230183	City of Atlanta	065372500
State of Hawaii	077676997	City of Honolulu	828979612
State of Idaho	071875734	City of Boise	070017017
State of Illinois	065232498	City of Chicago	556057206
State of Indiana	071789435	City of Indianapolis	964647155
State of Iowa	828089701	City of Davenport	963855494
State of Kansas	827975009	City of Wichita	069862755

*The proper name for the Republics under the Articles of Confederation was and is "Arizona", spelled in upper and lower case. It wasn't until the Constitution was ratified that these same political entities ALSO acquired an ADDITIONAL name as "The State of Arizona", spelled in upper and lower case. In acts of Congress written after the Constitution was ratified, the SOVEREIGN AND LEGISLATIVELY FOREIGN STATE under the Articles of Confederation was referred to as the "Republic of Arizona", spelled in upper and lower case. These entities is where all EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE and therefore LEGISLATIVELY FOREIGN PROPERTY is held, protected, and maintained. As EXCLUSIVELY private property, this property is NOT SUBJECT to the legislative jurisdiction of ANY government:*

1  
2 *"When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with*  
3 *some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his*  
4 *relations to others, he might retain. "A body politic," [Editor's note:*  
5 *A body politic, is a SOCIAL COMPACT by which the whole people*  
6 *covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people,*  
7 *that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good] as*  
8 *aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts,*  
9 *"is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each*  
10 *citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be*  
11 *governed by certain laws for the common good."*

12 *THIS DOES NOT CONFER POWER UPON THE WHOLE PEOPLE*  
13 *TO CONTROL RIGHTS WHICH ARE PURELY & EXCLUSIVELY*  
14 *PRIVATE, THORPE V. R. & B. RAILROAD CO., 27 VT. 143; but it*  
15 *does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so*  
16 *conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to*  
17 *injure another. This is the very essence of government, and has found*  
18 *expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas. From this*  
19 *source come the POLICE POWERS, which, as was said by Mr. Chief*  
20 *Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, "are nothing more or*  
21 *less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty,...*  
22 *that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things." Under these*  
23 *powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards*  
24 *another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when*  
25 *such regulation becomes necessary for the public good. [Munn. verses*  
26 *Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)].*

Attachment A-3

*US Corporate State "United States Government" DUN# 052714196, is listed as a corporation with Dun and Bradstreet's credit tracking system as a private business, which is not governmental, which is not sovereign.*

<i>Agency</i>	<i>DUN #</i>
United States Government	052714196
US Department of Defense (DOD)	030421397
US Department of the Treasury	026661067
US Department of Justice (DOJ)	011669674
US Department of State	026276622
US Department of Health & Human Services (HHS)	Office of the Secretary
112463521	

*The proper name for the Republics under the Articles of Confederation was and is "Arizona." It wasn't until the Constitution was ratified that these same political entities ALSO acquired an ADDITIONAL name as "The State of Arizona". In acts of Congress written after the Constitution was ratified, the **SOVEREIGN AND LEGISLATIVELY FOREIGN STATE** under the Articles of Confederation was referred to as the "Republic of Arizona". This entities is where all **EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE** and therefore **LEGISLATIVELY FOREIGN PROPERTY** is held, protected, and maintained. As **EXCLUSIVELY** private property, this property is NOT SUBJECT to the legislative jurisdiction of ANY government:*

*"When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. "A body politic," [Editor's note: A body politic, is a SOCIAL COMPACT by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good] as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, "is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen*

1 *with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the*  
2 *common good."*

3 ***THIS DOES NOT CONFER POWER UPON THE WHOLE PEOPLE***  
4 ***TO CONTROL RIGHTS WHICH ARE PURELY AND***  
5 ***EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE, THORPE V. R. & B. RAILROAD CO., 27***  
6 ***VT. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each***  
7 ***citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not***  
8 ***unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government,***  
9 ***and 125\*125 has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut***  
10 ***alienum non lædas. From this source come the POLICE POWERS,***  
11 ***which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5***  
12 ***How. 583, "are nothing more or less than the powers of government***  
13 ***inherent in every sovereignty,... that is to say, . . . the power to govern***  
14 ***men and things."*** Under these powers the government regulates the  
15 conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which  
16 each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes  
17 necessary for the public good.  
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21 ***[Munn. verses Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)].***  
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Attachment B

*Tharp verses Blake, Tex. Civ. App., 171 38 S.W. 549, 550; Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pages 1251-1251. Organic Law; Quote from Statutes at Large, 16 Stat. 419 (1871). A statute by which a municipal corporation is organized and created is its "organic act" and the limit of its power, so that all acts beyond the scope of the powers there granted are void. Tharp verses Blake, Tex. Civ. App., 171 38 S.W. 549, 550.*

*ORGANIC LAW. The fundamental law, or constitution, of a state or nation, written or unwritten; that law or system of laws or principles which defines and establishes **THE ORGANIZATION OF ITS GOVERNMENT**. St. Louis verses Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 L.R.A. 686, 68 Am. St. Rep. 575. [Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pages 1251-1251].*

*The "District of Columbia" was created as a municipal corporation by the District of Columbia Act of 1871, 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34. The relevant portions of that act read as follows: "CHAPTER LXII. – An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a government of the name of the District of Columbia, by which name it is hereby constituted a body corporate for municipal purposes, and may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, have a seal, and exercise all other powers of a municipal corporation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United*

1 *States and the provisions of this act.” [Statutes at Large, 16 Stat. 419 (1871).*

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**Attachment C**  
**U.S. Supreme Court Decisions**  
**That Determine “What Is a State?”**

The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed this conclusion when it held the following:

*Both before and after the time when the Dictionary Act and §1983 were passed, the phrase “bodies politic and corporate” was understood to include the [governments of the] States. See, e.g., J. Bouvier, 1 A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America 185 (11th ed. 1866); W. Shumaker & G. Longsdorf, Cyclopedic Dictionary of Law 104 (1901); **Chisholm verses Georgia**, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 447, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793) (Iredell, J.); *id.*, at 468 (Cushing, J.); **Cotton verses United States**, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231, 13 L.Ed. 675 (1851) (“Every sovereign State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person”); **Poindexter verses Greenhow**, 114 U.S. 270, 288, 5 S.Ct. 903, 29 L.Ed. 185 (1885); **McPherson verses Blacker**, 146 U.S. 1, 24, 13 S.Ct. 3, 6, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1892); **Heim verses McCall**, 239 U.S. 175, 188, 36 S.Ct. 78, 82, 60 L.Ed. 206 (1915). See also **United States verses Maurice**, 2 Brock. 96, 109, 26 F.Cas. 1211 (CC Va.1823) (Marshall, C.J.) (“**The United States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate**”); **Van Brocklin verses Tennessee**, 117 U.S. 151, 154, 6 S.Ct. 670, 672, 29 L.Ed. 845 (1886) (same). Indeed, the very legislators who passed §1 referred to States in these terms. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 661-662 (1871) (Sen. Vickers) (“**What is a State? Is \*79 it not a body politic and corporate?**”); *id.*, at 696 (Sen. Edmunds) (“A State is a corporation”).*

Attachment D

U.S. Supreme Court Decision  
*Will verses Michigan Department of State Police,*  
*491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (U.S.Mich.,1989).*

*“While it is certainly true that the phrase “bodies politic and corporate” referred to private and public corporations, see ante, at 2311, and n. 9, this fact does not draw into question the conclusion that this phrase also applied to the States. Phrases may, of course, have multiple referents. Indeed, each and every dictionary cited by the Court accords a broader realm-one \*\*2317 that comfortably, and in most cases explicitly, includes the sovereign-to this phrase than the Court gives it today. See 1B. Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English Jurisprudence 155 (1879) (“[T]he term body politic is often used in a general way, as meaning the state or the sovereign power, or the city government, without implying any distinct express incorporation”); W. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 127 (1893) (“[B]ody politic”: “The governmental, sovereign power: a city or a State”); Black’s Law Dictionary 143 (1891) (“[B]ody politic”: “It is often used, in a rather loose way, to designate the state or nation or sovereign power, or the government of a county or municipality, without distinctly connoting any express and individual corporate charter”); 1A. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 212 (2d ed. 1871) (“[B]ody politic”: “A body to take in succession, framed by policy”; “[p]articularly\*80 applied, in the old books, to a Corporation sole”); id., at 383 (“Corporation sole” includes the sovereign in England).*

1 *[Will verses Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct.*  
2 *2304 (U.S. Michigan, 1989)].*

3  
4 **Attachment E**

5  
6 **U.S. Supreme Court Decisions**  
7 ***Downes verses Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).***

8 *“Indeed, the practical interpretation put by Congress upon the Constitution*  
9 *has been long continued and uniform to the effect [182 U.S. 244, 279] that*  
10 *the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or*  
11 *conquest, only when and so far as Congress shall so direct.*  
12 *Notwithstanding its duty to 'guarantee to every state in this Union a*  
13 *republican form of government' (Article 4, 4), by which we understand,*  
14 *according to the definition of Webster, 'a government in which the supreme*  
15 *power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by*  
16 *representatives elected by them,' Congress did not hesitate, in the original*  
17 *organization of the territories of Louisiana, Florida, the Northwest*  
18 *Territory, and its subdivisions of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and*  
19 *Wisconsin and still more recently in the case of Alaska, to establish a form*  
20 *of government bearing a much greater analogy to a British Crown colony*  
21 *than a republican state of America, and to vest the legislative power either*  
22 *in a governor and council, or a governor and judges, to be appointed by the*  
23 *President. It was not until they had attained a certain population that power*  
24 *was given them to organize a legislature by vote of the people. In all these*  
25 *cases, as well as in territories subsequently organized west of the Mississippi,*

1 Congress thought it necessary either to extend to Constitution and laws of the  
2 United States over them, or to declare that the inhabitants should be entitled  
3 to enjoy the right of trial by jury, of bail, and of the privilege of the writ of  
4 habeas corpus, as well as other privileges of the bill of rights.”

5 **[Downes verses Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)].**

6  
7 **Attachment F**

8  
9 **U.S. Supreme Court Decision**  
10 ***Osborn verses Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824).***

11 ***“The mere creation of a corporation, does not confer political power or***  
12 ***political character. So this Court decided in Dartmouth College verses***  
13 ***Woodward, already referred to. If I may be allowed to paraphrase the***  
14 ***language of the Chief Justice, I would say, a bank incorporated, is no more a***  
15 ***State instrument, than a natural person performing the same business would be.***  
16 ***If, then, a natural person, engaged in the trade of banking, should contract with***  
17 ***the government to receive the public money upon deposit, to transmit it from***  
18 ***place to place, without charging for commission or difference of exchange, and***  
19 ***to perform, when called upon, the duties of commissioner of loans, would not***  
20 ***thereby become a public officer, how is it that this artificial being, created by***  
21 ***law for the purpose of being employed by the government for the same***  
22 ***purposes, should become a part of the civil government of the country? Is it***  
23 ***because its existence, its capacities, its powers, are given by law? because the***  
24 ***government has given it power to take and hold property in a particular form,***  
25 ***and to employ that property for particular purposes, and in the disposition of it***

1 to use a particular name? because the government has sold it a privilege [22  
2 U.S. 738, 774] for a large sum of money, and has bargained with it to do  
3 certain things; is it, therefore, a part of the very government with which the  
4 contract is made?"

5  
6 **[Osborn verses Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824)].**

7  
8 **Attachment G**

9  
10 **U.S. Supreme Court Decision**  
11 ***Proprietors of Charles River Bridge verses Proprietors of Warren Bridge,***  
12 ***36 U.S. 420 (1837).***

13 *"Corporations are also of all grades, and made for varied objects; all*  
14 *governments are corporations, created by usage and common consent, or*  
15 *grants and charters which create a body politic for prescribed purposes; but*  
16 *whether they are private, local or general, in their objects, for the*  
17 *enjoyment of property, or the exercise of power, they are all governed by*  
18 *the same rules of law, as to THE CONSTRUCTION AND THE*  
19 *OBLIGATION OF THE INSTRUMENT BY WHICH THE*  
20 *INCORPORATION IS MADE. One universal rule of law protects persons*  
21 *and property. It is a fundamental principle of the common law of England,*  
22 *that the term freemen of the kingdom, includes 'all persons,' ecclesiastical*  
23 *and temporal, incorporate, politique or natural; it is a part of their magna*  
24 *charta (2 Inst. 4), and is incorporated into our institutions. The persons of*  
25 *the members of corporations are on the same footing of protection as other*  
26 *persons, and their corporate property secured by the same laws, which*

1 *protect that of individuals. 2 Inst. 46-7. 'No man shall be taken,' 'no man*  
3 *shall be disseised,' without due process of law, is a principle taken from*  
4 *magna charta, infused into all our state constitutions, and is made inviolable*  
5 *by the federal government, by the amendments to the constitution."*

6 ***[Proprietors of Charles River Bridge verses Proprietors of Warren Bridge,***  
7 ***36 U.S. 420 (1837)].***

## 8 9 **Attachment H**

### 10 **U.S. Supreme Court Decision** 11 ***National Mutual Insurance Company of District of Columbia*** 12 ***verses Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).***

13 *"The argument that congressional powers over the District are not to*  
14 *be exercised outside of its territorial limits also is pressed upon us.*  
15 *But this same contention has long been held by this Court to be*  
16 *untenable.*

17 ***In Cohens [337 U.S. 582 , 601] verses Commonwealth of Virginia, 6 Wheat.***  
18 ***264, 429, Chief Justice Marshall, answering the argument that Congress,***  
19 ***when legislating for the District, 'was reduced to a mere local legislature,***  
20 ***whose laws could possess no obligation out of the ten miles square,' said***

21  
22 *'Congress is not a local legislature, but exercises this particular*  
23 *power, like all its other powers, in its high character, as the*  
24 *legislature of the Union.*

25 *"The American people thought it a necessary power, and they*  
26 *conferred it for their own benefit. Being so conferred it carries with it*  
27 *all those incidental powers which are necessary to its complete and*



1 effectual execution.' In *O'Donoghue verses United States*, 289 U.S.  
2 516, 539, 746, this Court approved a statement made by Circuit Judge  
3 Taft, later Chief Justice of this Court, speaking for himself and Judge  
4 (later Mr. Justice) Lurton, that **"The object of the grant of exclusive**  
5 **legislation over the district was, therefore, national in the highest**  
6 **sense, and the city organized under the grant became the city, not of**  
7 **a state, not of a district, but of a nation."**

8 "In the same article which granted the powers of exclusive legislation  
9 over its seat of government are conferred all the other great powers  
10 which make the nation, including the power to borrow money on the  
11 credit of the United States. He would be a strict constructionist,  
12 indeed, who should deny to congress the exercise of this latter power  
13 in furtherance of that of organizing and maintaining a proper local  
14 government at the seat of government. Each is for a national purpose,  
15 and the one may be used in aid of the other.' \* \* \* And, just prior to  
16 enactment of the statute now challenged on this ground, the Court of  
17 Appeals for the District itself, sitting en banc, and relying on the  
18 foregoing authorities, had said that **Congress 'possesses full and**  
19 **unlimited jurisdiction to provide for the general welfare' of District**  
20 **citizens 'by any and every act of legislation which it may deem**  
21 **conducive to that end. \* \* \* [337 U.S. 582 , 602] when it legislates**  
22 **for the District, Congress acts as a legislature of national character,**  
23 **exercising complete legislative control as contrasted with the limited**  
24 **power of a state legislature, on the one hand, and as contrasted with**  
25 **the limited sovereignty which Congress exercises within the**  
26 **boundaries of the states, on the other.'**

27 [Neild verses *District of Columbia*, 71 App.D.C. 306, 110 F.2d. 246, 250.

28 [National Mutual Insurance Company of District Of Columbia verses  
*Tidewater Transfer Co.*, 337 U.S. 582 (1949)].

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## Attachment I

### The History of the District of Columbia And Chronology of Some Events.

#### General History of The District of Columbia.

1. When the United States Constitution was adopted on September 15, 1787, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17, included language authorizing the establishment of a federal district. This district was not to exceed 10 miles square, under the exclusive legislative authority of Congress. On July 16, 1790, Congress authorized President George Washington to choose a permanent site for the capital city and, on December 1, 1800, the capital was moved from Philadelphia to an area along the Potomac River. The census of 1800 showed that the new capital had a population of 14,103.
2. The District of Columbia Bicentennial Commission was established to develop plans for the celebration of various anniversary dates in District of Columbia history. The commission is comprised of 39 members with a specified number of commissioners appointed by the mayor, the chairman of the D.C. Council, council members, the District delegate to the House of Representatives, the courts, and the *District of Columbia Bar*.
3. Among the events celebrated are the 200th anniversary of the Residency Act, which established that there shall be a permanent seat of government on the Potomac River (July 16, 1990); the 200th anniversary of President George Washington's proclamation of the site for the federal district (January 24, 1991); and the 200th anniversary of the arrival of Pierre L'Enfant, Benjamin Banneker and Andrew Ellicott. The commission may designate other bicentennial events for celebration.
4. *There have been several forms of appointed and elected governments in the District of Columbia:* an appointed, three-member commission (1790-1802); elected councils and an appointed mayor (1802-1820); elected councils and an elected mayor (1820-1871); an appointed governor, a two-house legislature (one appointed and the other elected), and an elected, non-voting delegate to the Congress (1871-1874); and another appointed, three-member commission (1874-1967). *Following the defeat by Congress of a home rule effort in 1967, then-President Lyndon B. Johnson reorganized*

1 *the District government and created the positions of an appointed*  
2 *mayor/commissioner and an appointed nine-member council.*

- 3 5. District residents won the right to vote in a presidential election on March  
4 29, 1961, to elect a board of education in 1968 and, in 1970, to elect a non-  
5 voting delegate to the House of Representatives. *In 1973, Congress*  
6 *approved a bill that provided District residents with an elected form of*  
7 *government with limited home rule authority; as a result, District residents*  
8 *voted for a mayor and a council for the first time in more than 100 years.*  
9 *District residents accepted the home rule charter by referendum vote in*  
10 *1974. Congress delegated to the District government the authority,*  
11 *functions and powers of a state, with a very important exception:* Congress  
12 retains control over the District's revenue and expenditures by annually  
13 reviewing the entire District government budget. In addition, Congress has  
14 repeatedly prohibited the District from imposing a non-resident income tax.  
15 6. In 1980, District voters approved a statehood initiative by a majority of 60  
16 percent; delegates to a statehood constitutional convention were elected in  
17 1981 and, in 1983, a bill for the admission of the state of New Columbia was  
18 introduced in Congress. The "Constitution for the State of New Columbia" is  
19 still under congressional consideration and is reintroduced into each new  
20 congressional session. Under the specifications of the statehood initiatives,  
21 most of the land area of the District of Columbia would become the state of  
22 New Columbia; the District of Columbia would continue to exist, albeit  
23 reduced in size to an area consisting of the White House, the Capitol, the  
24 Supreme Court, the Mall and federal monuments and government buildings  
25 adjacent to the Mall.

## 26 **CHRONOLOGY OF SOME EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE** 27 **DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.**

28 **May 15, 1751:** The Maryland Assembly appoints commissioners to lay a town  
on the Potomac River, above the mouth of Rock Creek, on 60 acres of land to  
be purchased from George Gordon and George Beall. This settlement becomes  
Georgetown.

**February 27, 1752:** The survey and plat of Georgetown into 80 lots is  
completed.

**September 17, 1787:** The Constitution is signed by the members of the Constitutional Convention.

**June 21, 1788: *The 1788 U.S. Constitution*,** as adopted by the Constitutional Convention on September 15, 1787, is ratified by the states. ***Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17***, gives Congress authority "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States...."

**July 16, 1790: *The Residency Act of 1790*** gives the president power to choose a site for the capital city on the east bank of the Potomac River between the mouth of the Eastern Branch and the Connogocheague Creek (now Conococheague) near Hagerstown, nearly 70 miles upstream.

**January 22, 1791:** George Washington appoints Thomas Johnson and Daniel Carroll of Rock Creek, representing Maryland and Dr. David Stuart, to represent Virginia, as "Commissioners for surveying the District of (sic) Territory accepted by the said Act for the permanent seat of the Government of the United States...."

**January 24, 1791:** President George Washington selects a site that includes portions of Maryland and Virginia.

**December 1, 1800:** The federal capital is transferred from Philadelphia to the site on the Potomac River now called the City of Washington, in the territory of Columbia. At the time of the 1800 census, the population of the new capital included 10,066 whites, 793 free Negroes and 3,244 slaves.

**February 27, 1801:** Congress divides the [District] into the counties of Washington and Alexandria.

**May 3, 1802:** Congress grants the City of Washington its first municipal charter. Voters, defined as white males who pay taxes and have lived in the city for at least a year, receive the right to elect a 12-member council. The mayor is

1 appointed by the president.

2 **May 4, 1812:** Congress amends the charter of the City of Washington to  
3 provide for an eight-member board of aldermen and a 12-member common  
4 council. The aldermen and the common council elect the mayor.

5 **March 15, 1820:** Under the Act of 1820, Congress amends the Charter of the  
6 City of Washington for the direct election of the mayor by resident voters.

7 **July 9, 1846:** Congress passes a law returning the city of Alexandria and  
8 Alexandria County to the state of Virginia.

9 **May 17, 1848:** Congress adopts a new charter for the City of Washington and  
10 expands the number of elected offices to include a board of assessors, a  
11 surveyor, a collector and a registrar.

12 **April 16, 1862:** Congress abolishes slavery in the federal district (the City of  
13 Washington, Washington County, and Georgetown). This action predates both  
14 the Emancipation Proclamation and the adoption of the 13th Amendment to the  
15 Constitution.

16 **January 8, 1867:** Congress grants black males the right to vote in local  
17 elections.

18 **June 1, 1871:** The elected mayor and council of Washington City and  
19 Georgetown, and the County Levy Court are abolished by Congress and  
20 replaced by a governor and council appointed by the president. An elected  
21 House of Delegates and a non-voting delegate to Congress are created. In this  
22 act, the jurisdiction and territorial government came to be called the District of  
23 Columbia, thus combining the governments of Georgetown, the City of  
24 Washington and the County of Washington. *A seal and motto, "Justitia  
Omnibus" (Justice for All), are adopted for the District of Columbia.*

25 **June 20, 1874:** The territorial government of the District of Columbia,  
26 including the non-voting delegate to Congress, is abolished. Three temporary  
27 commissioners and a subordinate military engineer are appointed by the

1 president.

2 **June 11, 1878:** In *The Organic Act of 1878* [20 Stat. 102-108], Congress  
3 approves the establishment of the District of Columbia government as a  
4 municipal corporation governed by three presidentially appointed  
5 commissioners two civilian commissioners and a commissioner from the  
6 military corps of engineers. This form of government lasted until August 1967.

7 **July 4, 1906:** The District Building, on 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue,  
8 becomes the official City Hall.

9 **July 1, 1952:** The Reorganization Plan of 1952 transfers to the three  
10 commissioners the functions of more than 50 boards.

11 **March 29, 1961:** The 23rd Amendment to the Constitution gives District  
12 residents the right to vote for president.

13 **February 20, 1967:** The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority is  
14 created through a compact between the District of Columbia, Maryland and  
15 Virginia.

16 **April 22, 1968:** District residents receive the right to elect a Board of  
17 Education.

18 **December 24, 1973:** Congress approves the *District of Columbia Self-*  
19 *Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Public Law 93-198*,  
20 which establishes an elected mayor and a 13-member council.

21 **May 7, 1974:** Voters of the District of Columbia approve by referendum the  
22 District Charter and the establishment of advisory neighborhood commissions.  
23 General elections are held for mayor and council on November 5, 1974.

24 **January 2, 1975:** The newly elected Mayor Walter Washington and first  
25 elected council take office.

26 **February 3, 1976:** The first election for advisory neighborhood commissioners  
27

1 is held.

2 **March 29, 1978:** The first segment of the Metrorail Red Line opens.

3  
4 **August 22, 1978:** Congress approves the District of Columbia Voting Rights  
5 Amendment, which would give District residents voting representation in the  
6 House and the Senate. The proposed constitutional amendment was not ratified  
7 by the necessary number of states (38) within the allotted seven years.

8 **January 2, 1979:** The Mayor Marion Barry takes office.

9 **November 4, 1980:** District electors approve the *District of Columbia*  
10 *Statehood Constitutional Convention of 1979*, which became D.C. Law 3-171  
11 and which called for convening a state constitutional convention.

12 **November 2, 1982:** After the constitutional convention, a Constitution for the  
13 State of New Columbia is ratified by District voters.

14 **October 1, 1984:** The District enters the **MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET**.

15 **October 29, 1986:** Congress approves an amendment to the District of  
16 Columbia Stadium Act of 1957, which authorizes the transfer of Robert F.  
17 Kennedy Stadium from the federal government to the District of Columbia  
18 government.

19 **February 20, 1987:** The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority is  
20 created to acquire Washington National and Washington - Dulles International  
21 airports from the federal government, pursuant to Public Law 99-151, The  
22 Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986. The authority begins operating  
the airports on June 7, 1987.

23 **October 1, 1987:** Saint Elizabeth's Hospital is transferred to the District of  
24 Columbia government pursuant to Public Law. Financial Control Board and a  
25 mayor-appointed Chief Financial Officer.

26 **January 2, 1992:** Mayor Sharon Pratt Dixon, the first woman mayor, takes  
27

1 office.

2 **July 13, 1995:** The newly appointed financial control board holds its first  
3 public meeting. It is composed of Dr. Andrew Brimmer, chair; and members:  
4 Joyce A. Ladner, Constance B. Newman, Stephen D. Harlan and Edward A.  
5 Singletary. John Hill is the Executive Director and Daniel Rezneck is the  
6 General Counsel.

7 **February 14, 1996: Mayor Barry announces a transformation plan to**  
8 **reduce the size of government and increase its efficiency.**



Attachment K

*State of Minnesota verses Brundage, 180 U.S. 499 (1901).*

*"We have held, upon full consideration, that although under existing statutes a circuit court of the United States has jurisdiction upon habeas corpus to discharge from the custody of **state officers or tribunals** one restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States, it is not required in every case to exercise its power to that end immediately upon application being made for the writ. 'We cannot suppose,' this court has said, 'that Congress intended to compel those courts, by such means, to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions **commenced in state courts** exercising authority within the same territorial limits, where the accused claims that he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon 'to dispose of the party as law and justice require' [R. S. 761], does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers **conferred** upon it. That discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the states, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution. **When the petitioner is in custody by state authority** for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof; **or where, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and***

1 domiciled therein, he is in custody, under like authority, for an act done or  
2 omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or  
3 exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any  
4 foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend  
5 upon the law of nations; in such and like cases of urgency, involving the  
6 authority and operations of the general government, or the obligations of  
7 this country to, or its relations with, foreign nations, [180 U.S. 499, 502]  
8 the courts of the United States have frequently interposed by writs of  
9 habeas corpus and discharged prisoners who were held in custody under  
10 state authority. So, also, when they are in the custody of a state officer, it  
11 may be necessary, by use of the writ, to bring them into a court of the United  
12 States to testify as witnesses.' *Ex parte Royall*, 117 U.S. 241, 250 , 29 S.L.Ed.  
13 868, 871, 6 Sup.Ct.Rep. 734; *Ex parte Fonda*, 117 U.S. 516, 518 , 29 S.L.Ed.  
14 994, 6 Sup.Ct.Rep. 848; *Re Duncan*, 139 U.S. 449 , 454, sub nom. **Duncan**  
15 **verses McCall**, 35 L.Ed. 219, 222, 11 Sup.Ct.Rep. 573; *Re Wood*, 140 U.S.  
16 278 , 289, Sub nom. **Wood verses Bursh**, 35 L.Ed. 505, 509, 11 Sup.Ct.Rep.  
17 738; **McElvaine verses Brush**, 142 U.S. 155, 160 , 35 S.L.Ed. 971, 973, 12  
18 Sup.Ct.Rep. 156; **Cook verses Hart**, 146 U.S. 183, 194 , 36 S.L.Ed. 934, 939,  
19 13 Sup.Ct.Rep. 40; **Re Frederich**, 149 U.S. 70, 75 , 37 S.L.Ed. 653, 656, 13  
20 Sup.Ct.Rep. 793; **New York verses Eno**, 155 U.S. 89, 96 , 39 S.L.Ed. 80, 83,  
21 15 Sup.Ct.Rep. 30; **Pepke verses Cronan**, 155 U.S. 100 , 39 L.Ed. 84, 15  
22 Sup.Ct.Rep. 34; **Re Chapman**, 156 U.S. 211, 216 , 39 S.L.Ed. 401, 402, 15  
23 Sup.Ct.Rep. 331; **Whitten verses Tomlinson**, 160 U.S. 231, 242 , 40 S.L.Ed.  
24 406, 412, 16 Sup.Ct.Rep. 297; **Iasigi verses Van De Carr**, 166 U.S. 391,

1 395 , 41 S.L.Ed. 1045, 1049, 17 Sup.Ct.Rep. 595; **Baker verses Grice**, 169  
2 U.S. 284, 290 , 42 S.L.Ed. 748, 750, 18 Sup.Ct.Rep. 323; **Tinsley verses**  
3 **Anderson**, 171 U.S. 101, 105 , 43 S.L.Ed. 91, 96, 18 Sup.Ct.Rep. 805; **Fitts**  
4 **verses McGhee**, 172 U.S. 516, 533 , 43 S.L.Ed. 535, 543, 19 Sup.Ct.Rep.  
5 269; **Markuson verses Boucher**, 175 U.S. 184 , 44 L.Ed. 124, 20 Sup.Ct.Rep.  
6 76.”

7 “There are cases that come within the exceptions to the general rule. In  
8 *Loney's Case*, 134 U.S. 372 , 375, sub nom. *Thomas verses Loney*, 33 L.Ed.  
9 949, 951, 10 Sup.Ct.Rep. 584, 585, it appeared that Loney was held in  
10 custody by the state authorities under a charge of perjury committed in  
11 giving his deposition as a witness before a notary public in Richmond.  
12 Virginia, in the case of a contested election of a member of the House of  
13 Representatives of the United States. He was discharged upon a writ of  
14 habeas corpus sued out from the circuit court of the United States, this court  
15 saying: 'The power of punishing a witness for testifying falsely in a judicial  
16 proceeding belongs peculiarly to the government in whose tribunals that  
17 proceeding is had. It is essential to the impartial and efficient administration  
18 of justice in the tribunals of the nation, that witnesses should be able to testify  
19 freely before them, unrestrained by legislation of the state, or by fear of  
20 punishment in the state courts. The administration of justice in the national  
21 tribunals would be greatly embarrassed and impeded if a witness testifying  
22 before a court of the United States, or upon a contested election of a member  
23 of Congress, were liable to prosecution and punishment in the courts of the  
24 state upon a charge of perjury, preferred by a disappointed suitor or  
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26  
27

1 *contestant, or instigated by local passion or prejudice.'* So, in **Ohio verses**  
2 **Thomas**, 173 U.S. 276, 284 , 285 S., 43 L.Ed. 699, 702, 19 Sup.Ct.Rep. 453,  
3 456, *which was the case of the arrest of the acting governor [180 U.S. 499,*  
4 *503] of the Central Branch of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer*  
5 *Soldiers, at Dayton, Ohio, upon a charge of violating a law of that state, the*  
6 *action of the circuit court of the United States discharging him upon habeas*  
7 *corpus, while in custody of the state authorities, was upheld upon the ground*  
8 *that the state court had no jurisdiction in the premises, and because the*  
9 *accused, being a Federal officer, 'may, upon conviction, be imprisoned as a*  
10 *means of enforcing the sentence of a fine, and thus the operations of the*  
11 *Federal government might in the meantime be obstructed.'* The exception to  
12 *the general rule was further illustrated in* **Boske verses Comingore**, 177 U.S.  
13 459, 466 , 467 S., 44 L .Ed. 846, 849, 20 Sup. Ct.Rep. 701, 704, *in which the*  
14 *applicant for the writ of habeas corpus was discharged by the circuit court of*  
15 *the United States, while held by state officers, this court saying: 'The present*  
16 *case was one of urgency, in that the appellee was an officer in the revenue*  
17 *service of the United States whose presence at his post of duty was important*  
18 *to the public interests, and whose detention in prison by the state authorities*  
19 *might have interfered with the regular and orderly course of the business of*  
20 *the department to which he belonged.'*

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23  
24 *[State of Minnesota verses Brundage, 180 U.S. 499 (1901)].*

25  
26 *[NOTE: The federal Courts of the United States as used above do not*  
27 *have the authority to interpose in foreign countries, but only in states*

1 of the Union for violations of the Constitution, and since they did  
2 interpose above, and since they did so in a "foreign state" and  
3 described that foreign state as a state of the Union, they are admitting  
4 of no federal legislative jurisdiction within any state of the Union].

## 5 **Attachment L**

6 ***Ngiraingas verses Sanchez*, 495 U.S. 182 (1990).**

7 “At common law, a "corporation" was an "artificial perso[n] endowed with the  
8 legal capacity of perpetual succession" consisting either of a single individual  
9 (termed a "corporation sole") or of a collection of several individuals (a  
10 "corporation aggregate"). 3 H. Stephen, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*  
11 166, 168 (1st Am. ed. 1845). The sovereign was considered a corporation. See  
12 *id.*, at 170; see also 1 W. Blackstone, *Commentaries* \*467. **Under the**  
13 **definitions supplied by contemporary law dictionaries, Territories would have**  
14 **been classified as "corporations" (and hence as "persons") at the time that**  
15 **1983 was enacted and the Dictionary Act recodified. See W. Anderson, A**  
16 **Dictionary of Law 261 (1893) ("All corporations were originally modeled upon**  
17 **a state or nation"); 1 J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution**  
18 **and Laws of the United States of America 318-319 (11th ed. 1866) ("In this**  
19 **extensive sense the United States may be termed a corporation"); Van Brocklin**  
20 **verses Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 154 (1886) ("The United States is a . . . great**  
21 **corporation . . . ordained and established by the American people") (quoting**  
22 ***United States verses Maurice*, 26 F.Cas. 1211, 1216 (No. 15,747) (CC Va.**  
23 **1823) (Marshall, C. J.)); *Cotton verses United States*, 11 How. 229, 231 (1851)**  
24 **(United States is "a corporation"). See generally *Trustees of Dartmouth***  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 *College verses Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 561-562 (1819) (explaining history of*  
2 *term "corporation").*

3  
4 *[Ngiraingas verses Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (1990)].*  
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## Attachment M

### Request for Return / Information

(Federal/State Tax Exchange Program - State and Local Government Use Only)

<b>SECTION A</b>	Return to Internal Revenue Service Disclosure Scanning Operation Stop 93A Post Office Box 621506 Atlanta, GA 30362-3006		
	<b>I am requesting the following identified return(s) / return information under terms of the Federal / State Tax Coordination Agreement. I understand disclosure or use of the information received for other than authorized tax administrative purposes is subject to criminal and civil liabilities under sections 7213 and 7431 of the Internal Revenue Code.</b>		
<b>SECTION B</b>	1. Name of Taxpayer		SSN / EIN
	Address		
	2. Information Requested Copy of return(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No Check the appropriate block <input type="checkbox"/> Transcript <input type="checkbox"/> Audit Workpapers <input type="checkbox"/> Outstanding balance of assessments including penalties and interest computed to _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify below) _____ (date)		Tax periods Type of return forms
	3. Reason requested (Check the appropriate block) <input type="checkbox"/> Pending Examination <input type="checkbox"/> Criminal Investigation <input type="checkbox"/> Pending Collection Activity <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____		
<b>SECTION C</b>	1. Name of employee making request		Date request made
	2. Group Manager Signature		Group Manager phone number Division / Branch / Group
	3. From (Signature / Authorized Representative)		Date signed Telephone number
	4. Requesting Agency Agency name Attention Street address Street address City, State, ZIP code		

#### Instructions for Form 8796-A, Request for Returns/Information under Federal/State Exchange Agreement

The form may be used by state and local tax agency personnel requesting return(s) or return information from IRS.

Complete Sections A, B and C. After signature approval, forward to the pre-printed address in Section A. State the agency's need and use for the requested data as specifically as possible in section B-3. A general statement that it is needed for tax administration is insufficient.

**Note:** Do not send expedite requests or other requests that require local handling to the address in Section A. Contact your local Disclosure Office. If the office agrees to expedite or otherwise handle your request locally, you will submit it directly to that office.

Form **8796-A** (9-2011)

Catalog Number 58558D

[www.irs.gov](http://www.irs.gov)

Department of the Treasury-Internal Revenue Service

Michael Willis Chase's Demand For Answers To Administrative and Procedural  
Matters Question. And Brief #3 in Support of Demand to Dismiss  
Court, Judges and Prosecutor Who Have No Force of Law  
Over The Accused. Page 79 of 96

Attachment N

*Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1216.*

*“Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. verses State, 65 Misc.Rep. 263, 121 N.Y.S. 536. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude every one else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of particular things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depends on another man’s courtesy.*

*The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership; corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. **It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes** real and personal property, easements, **franchises**, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one’s property rights by actionable wrong. Labberton verses General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wash.2d. 180, 332 P.2d. 250, 252, 254.*

*[. . .]*

***Property within constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering in citizen’s relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it.***



1 *Cereghino verses State By and Through State Highway Commission, 230 Or. 439,*  
2 *370 P.2d. 694, 697.”*

3  
4 *[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1216].*

5  
6  
7 **Attachment O**

8  
9 **Poindexter verses Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 5 S. Ct. 903 (1885).**

10 *“... the maxim that the King can do no wrong has no place in our system of*  
11 *government; yet it is also true, in respect to the State itself, that whatever wrong*  
12 *is attempted in its name is imputable to its government and not to the State, for,*  
13 *as it can speak and act only by law, whatever it does say and do must be lawful.*  
14 *That which therefore is unlawful because made so by the supreme law, the*  
15 *Constitution of the United States, is not the word or deed of the State, but is*  
16 *the mere wrong and trespass of those individual persons who falsely spread*  
17 *and act in its name.”*

18  
19  
20 *"This distinction is essential to the idea of constitutional government. To deny it*  
21 *or blot it out obliterates the line of demarcation that separates constitutional*  
22 *government from absolutism, free self-government based on the sovereignty*  
23 *of the people from that despotism, whether of the one or the many, which*  
24 *enables the AGENT of the state to declare and decree that he is the state; to*  
25 *say 'L'Etat, c'est moi.' Of what avail are written constitutions, whose bills of*  
26 *right, for the security of individual liberty, have been written too often with the*  
27

1 *blood of martyrs shed upon the battle-field and the scaffold, if their limitations*  
2 *and restraints upon power may be overpassed with impunity by the very*  
3 *AGENCIES created and appointed to guard, defend, and enforce them; and*  
4 *that, too, with the sacred authority of law, not only compelling obedience, but*  
5 *entitled to respect? And how else can these principles of individual liberty and*  
6 *right be maintained, if, when violated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to*  
7 *visit penalties upon individual offenders, who are the INSTRUMENTS OF*  
8 *WRONG, whenever they interpose the shield of the state? The doctrine is not*  
9 *to be tolerated. The whole frame and scheme of the political institutions of this*  
10 *country, state and federal, protest against it. Their continued existence is not*  
11 *compatible with it. It is the doctrine of ABSOLUTISM, pure, simple, and*  
12 *naked, and of COMMUNISM which is its twin, the double progeny of the*  
13 *same evil birth."*  
14

#### 15 16 Attachment P

17  
18 *Loan Association verses Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874).*  
19 *[U.S. verses Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)].*  
20 Black's Law Dictionary definition of "public purpose",  
21 "public use" and "tax".

22 *[Loan Association verses Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874)].*

23 *"The power to tax is, therefore, the strongest, the most pervading of all*  
24 *powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of*  
25 *the people. It was said by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of*  
26 *McCulloch verses Md., 4 Wheat. 431, that the power to tax is the*

1 *power to destroy. A striking instance of the truth of the proposition is*  
2 *seen in the fact that the existing tax of ten per cent, imposed by the*  
3 *United States on the circulation of all other banks than the National*  
4 *Banks, drove out of existence every \*state bank of circulation within a*  
5 *year or two after its passage. This power can be readily employed*  
6 *against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin*  
7 *the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if*  
8 *there is no implied limitation of the uses for which the power may be*  
9 *exercised.*

10  
11  
12 *“To lay, with one hand, the power of the government on the property*  
13 *of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored*  
14 *individuals to aid PRIVATE ENTERPRISES and build up*  
15 *PRIVATE FORTUNES, is none the less a ROBBERY because it is*  
16 *done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not*  
17 *legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms.*

18  
19 *“Nor is it taxation. ‘A tax,’ says Webster’s Dictionary, ‘is a rate or*  
20 *sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by*  
21 *government for the use of the nation or State.’ ‘Taxes are burdens or*  
22 *charges imposed by the Legislature upon persons or property to raise*  
23 *money for public purposes.’ Cooley, Const. Lim., 479.*

24  
25  
26 *Coulter, J., in Northern Liberties verses St. John’s Church, 13 Pa. St.*  
27

104 says, very forcibly, ‘I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that **taxes are a public imposition, levied by authority of the government for the purposes of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations—that they are imposed for a public purpose.**’ See, also *Pray verses Northern Liberties*, 31 Pa.St. 69; *Matter of Mayor of N.Y.*, 11 Johns., 77; *Camden verses Allen*, 2 Dutch., 398; *Sharpless verses Mayor*, *supra*; *Hanson verses Vernon*, 27 Ia., 47; *Whiting v. Fond du Lac*, *supra*.”

[*U.S. verses Butler*, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)].

"A tax, in the general understanding of the term and as used in the constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the government. The word has never thought to connote the **EXPROPRIATION OF MONEY** from one group for the benefit of another."

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “public purpose” as follows:

**“Public purpose.** In the law of taxation, eminent domain, etc., this is a term of classification to distinguish the objects for which, according to settled usage, the government is to provide, from those which, by the like usage, are left to private interest, inclination, or liberality. **The constitutional requirement that the purpose of any tax, police regulation, or particular exertion of the power of eminent domain shall be the convenience, safety, or welfare of the entire community and not the welfare of a specific individual or class of persons [such as, for instance, federal benefit recipients as individuals].** “Public

1       *purpose” that will justify expenditure of public money generally means*  
2       *such an activity as will serve as benefit to community as a body and*  
3       *which at same time is directly related function of government. **Pack***  
4       ***verses Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.**, 215 Tenn. 503, 387 S.W.2d.*  
5       *789, 794.*

6  
7       *“The term is synonymous with governmental purpose. As employed to*  
8       *denote the objects for which taxes may be levied, it has no relation to*  
9       *the urgency of the public need or to the extent of the public benefit*  
10       *which is to follow; **the essential requisite being that a public service***  
11       ***or use shall affect the inhabitants as a community, and not merely as***  
12       ***individuals.** A public purpose or public business has for its objective*  
13       *the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare,*  
14       *security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents*  
15       *within a given political division, as, for example, a state, the **sovereign***  
16       ***powers** of which are exercised to promote such public purpose or*  
17       *public business.”*

18  
19       *[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1231, Emphasis added].*

20  
21       A related word defined in Black’s Law Dictionary is “public use”:

22       ***“Public use.** Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis*  
23       *for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes,*  
24       *"public use" is one, which confers some benefit or advantage to the*  
25       *public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms*  
26       *of right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is*  
27

1 sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one  
2 or many members of public, a "public advantage" or "public benefit"  
3 accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. **Montana Power Co. verses**  
4 **Bokma, Mont.**, 457 P.2d. 769, 772, 773.

5  
6 “Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the  
7 right to take property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use  
8 concerning the whole community distinguished from particular  
9 individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally  
10 interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the  
11 object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient.  
12 **Ringe Co. verses Los Angeles County**, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692,  
13 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility,  
14 or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited  
15 to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in  
16 common, and not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful  
17 one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious  
18 general loss and inconvenience. A "public use" for which land may be  
19 taken defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions  
20 of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of  
21 scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances  
22 brought about by an increase in population and new modes of  
23 communication and transportation. *Katz verses Brandon*, 156 Conn.  
24 521, 245 A.2d. 579, 586. See also *Condemnation; Eminent domain*.  
25  
26 **[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1232].**  
27

Black's Law Dictionary also defines the word "tax" as follows:

*"Tax: A charge by the government on the income of an individual, corporation, or trust, as well as the value of an estate or gift. The objective in assessing the tax is to generate revenue to be used for the needs of the public.*

*"A pecuniary [relating to money] burden laid upon individuals or property to support the government, and is a payment exacted by legislative authority. **In re Mytinger**, D.C.Tex. 31 F.Supp. 977,978,979. **Essential characteristics of a tax are that it is NOT A VOLUNTARY PAYMENT OR DONATION, BUT AN ENFORCED CONTRIBUTION, EXACTED PURSUANT TO LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. Michigan Employment Sec. Commission verses Patt**, 4 Mich. App. 228, 144 N.W. 2d. 663, 665. ..."*

*[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1457].*

Attachment Q

**Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1856 Edition.**

*"An agent is liable for MISFEASANCE to third persons, when, intentionally or ignorantly, he commits a wrong, although authorized by his principal, because no one can lawfully authorize another to commit a wrong upon the rights or property of another. An agent is liable to refund money, when payment to him is void ab initio, (void from its inception) so that, the money was never received for the use of his principal, and he is consequently not accountable to the latter for it, if he has not actually paid over at the time he receives notice of the take. But unless 'caught with the money in his possession, the agent is not responsible. **This last rule, is however, subject to this qualification,** that the money shall have been lawfully received by the agent; for if, in receiving it, the agent was a wrongdoer, he will not be exempted from liability by payment to his principal."*



Attachment R

*Murray verses City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432 (1877)*

- and -

**“Corpus Juris Secundum”**

*“...when the United States [or The State of Arizona] enters into commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is treated like any other corporation...”*

***[91 Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), United States, §4 (2003)].***

*"What, then, is meant by the doctrine that contracts are made with reference to the taxing power resident in the State, and in subordination to it? Is it meant that when a person lends money to a State, or to a municipal division of the State having the power of taxation, there is in the contract a tacit reservation of a right in the debtor to raise contributions out of the money promised to be paid before payment? That cannot be, because if it could, the contract (in the language of Alexander Hamilton) would 'involve two contradictory things: an obligation to do, and a right not to do; an obligation to pay a certain sum, and a right to retain it in the shape of a tax. It is against the rules, both of law and of reason, to admit by implication in the construction of a contract a principle which goes in destruction of it.' The truth is, States and cities, when they borrow money and contract to repay it with interest, are not acting as sovereignties. They come down to the level of ordinary individuals. Their contracts have the same meaning as that of*

1 *similar contracts between private persons. Hence, instead of there being*  
2 *in the undertaking of a State or city to pay, a reservation of a sovereign*  
3 *right to withhold payment, the contract should be regarded as an*  
4 *assurance that such a right will not be exercised. A promise to pay, with*  
5 *a reserved right to deny or change the effect of the promise, is an*  
6 *absurdity."*

7  
8 *"Is, then, property, which consists in the promise of a State, or of a*  
9 *municipality of a State, beyond the reach of taxation? We do not affirm*  
10 *that it is. A State may undoubtedly tax any of its creditors within its*  
11 *jurisdiction for the debt due to him, and regulate the amount of the tax by*  
12 *the rate of interest the debt bears, if its promise be left unchanged. A tax*  
13 *thus laid impairs no obligation assumed. It leaves the contract*  
14 *untouched. But until payment of the debt or interest has been made, as*  
15 *stipulated, we think no act of State sovereignty can work an*  
16 *exoneration from what has been promised to the [446] creditor;*  
17 *namely, payment to him, without a violation of the Constitution. 'The*  
18 *true rule of every case of property founded on contract with the*  
19 *government is this: It must first be reduced into possession, and then it*  
20 *will become subject, in common with other similar property, to the right*  
21 *of the government to raise contributions upon it. It may be said that the*  
22 *government may fulfill this principle by paying the interest with one*  
23 *hand, and taking back the amount of the tax with the other. But to this*  
24 *the answer is, that, to comply truly with the rule, the tax must be upon*  
25 *all the money of the community, not upon the particular portion of it,*  
26  
27

1 *which is paid to the public creditors, and it ought besides to be so*  
2 *regulated as not to include a lien of the tax upon the fund. The creditor*  
3 *should be no otherwise acted upon than as every other possessor of*  
4 *money; and, consequently, the money he receives from the public can*  
5 *then only be a fit subject of taxation when it is entirely separated' (from*  
6 *the contract), 'and thrown undistinguished into the common mass.'* 3  
7 *Hamilton, Works, 514 et seq.* *Thus only can contracts with the State be*  
8 *allowed to have the same meaning as all other similar contracts have. “*  
9

10  
11 *[Murray verses City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432 (1877)].*  
12

### 13 Attachment S

14  
15 *U.S. ex. rel. Brookfield Const. Co. verses Stewart,*  
16 *284 F. Supp. 94 (1964).*  
17

18 *"In addition, there are several well known subordinate principles. The*  
19 *Government may not be sued except by its consent. The United States*  
20 *has not submitted to suit for specific performance\*99 or for an*  
21 *injunction. This **immunity** may not be avoided by naming an officer of*  
22 *the Government as a defendant. **The officer may be sued only if he acts***  
23 ***in excess of his statutory authority or in violation of the Constitution***  
24 ***for then he ceases to represent the Government."***  
25  
26  
27

1 *[Editor's note:* The "STATE OF ARIZONA", spelled in all caps, is  
2 not governmental, has no sovereign capacity. Therefore, no one in that  
3 capacity has statutory nor constitutional authority, nor immunity,  
4 because the de jure "The State of Arizona" in upper and lower case  
5 letters has been dissolved.]

## 6 **Attachment T**

7 *Spooner verses McConnell, 22 F. 939, 943;*  
8 *Julliard verses Greenman: 110 U.S. 421, (1884).*

9 *"The sovereignty of a state does not reside in the persons who fill the*  
10 *different departments of its government, but in the People, from*  
11 *whom the government emanated; and they may change it at their*  
12 *discretion. Sovereignty, then in this country, abides with the*  
13 *constituency, and not with the AGENT; and this remark is true, both*  
14 *in reference to the federal and state government."*

15 *[Spooner verses McConnell, 22 F. 939, 943].*

16  
17 *"There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the*  
18 *government of the United States ... In this country sovereignty resides*  
19 *in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have*  
20 *not, by their Constitution entrusted to it: All else is withheld."*

21 *[Julliard verses Greenman: 110 U.S. 421, (1884)].*

22 *Spooner verses McConnell, 22 F. 939, 943;*

23 *Julliard verses Greenman: 110 U.S. 421, (1884).*

24 *"The sovereignty of a state does not reside in the persons who fill the*  
25 *different departments of its government, but in the People, from whom the*  
26 *government emanated; and they may change it at their discretion.*

1 *Sovereignty, then in this country, abides with the constituency, and not*  
2 *with the AGENT; and this remark is true, both in reference to the federal*  
3 *and state government."*

4 *[Spooner verses McConnell, 22 F. 939, 943].*

5  
6 *"There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the*  
7 *government of the United States .... In this country sovereignty resides in*  
8 *the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by*  
9 *their Constitution entrusted to it: All else is withheld."*

10  
11 *[Julliard verses Greenman: 110 U.S. 421, (1884)].*

12 *[Editor's note: Michael Willis Chase is the state, according to the*  
13 *Law of Nations.]*

#### Attachment U

14  
15 *United States verses Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996)*  
16 *Clearfield Trust Co. verses United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943)*

17 *(Clearfield Trust Co. verses United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943)).*

18  
19 *("The United States does business on business terms") (quoting United*  
20 *States verses National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U.S. 527, 534*  
21 *(1926)); Perry verses United States, supra at 352 (1935)*

22  
23 *("When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes*  
24 *contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of*  
25 *individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no*  
26

1 *difference ... except that the United States cannot be sued without its*  
2 *consent") (citation omitted); United States verses Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53,*  
3 *66 (1877)*  
4

5 *("The United States, when they contract with their citizens, are*  
6 *controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf");*  
7

8 *(Cooke verses United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (explaining that*  
9 *when the United States*

10 *"comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of*  
11 *commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals*  
12 *there").*  
13

14 *See Jones, 1 Cl.Ct. at 85*  
15

16 *("Wherever the public and private acts of the government seem to*  
17 *commingle, a citizen or corporate body must by supposition be*  
18 *substituted in its place, and then the question be determined whether the*  
19 *action will lie against the supposed defendant");*  
20

21 *O'Neill verses United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 823, 826 (1982)*  
22

23 *Sovereign acts doctrine applies where,*  
24

25 *"[w]ere [the] contracts exclusively between private parties, the party hurt*  
26 *by such governing action could not claim compensation from the other*  
27

1 party for the governing action"). The dissent ignores these statements  
2 (including the statement from Jones, from which case Horowitz drew its  
3 reasoning literally verbatim), when it says, post at 931, that the sovereign  
4 acts cases do not emphasize the need to treat the government-as-  
5 contractor the same as a private party.

6 **[United States versus Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996)].**


7  
8 **Verification.**

9 I, Michael Willis Chase, Declarant, am the identified party in the above –  
10 entitled **"Demand For Answers To Administrative and Procedural Matters**  
11 **Question. And Brief #3 in Support of Demand to Dismiss Court, Judges**  
12 **and Prosecutor Who Have No Force of Law Over The Accused."** I have read  
13 the foregoing Demand and Brief in Support, and know the contents thereof. I  
14 declare that the above is correct and certain to the best of my knowledge.

15 I make this Asseveration with all my mental faculties intact and in good health,  
16 not under the influence of drugs, nor under undue influence exerted against my  
17 will and over my objections. I herein declare:

- 18 1. THAT I'm competent to state to the matters set forth herein.  
19 2. THAT I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.  
20 3. THAT all the facts stated herein are correct and certain to the best of my  
21 knowledge, are admissible as evidence, and if called upon as a witness,  
22 I will testify to their veracity.


23 Dated this 25th day of October, 2021.

24   
25 Michael Willis Chase of the Chase Family,  
26 Pro Se, Principal Creditor for  
27 **MICHAEL WILLIS CHASE™**, which  
28 is a Corporate Identity, a Legal Fiction in  
all uppercase, a decedent. All rights reserved.


  
Seal



Witnessed by:

1. 

Steven Lee McMillan

2. 


Steven Lee McMillan

as: "...at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses,  
shall the matter be established." Deuteronomy 19:15

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Michael Willis Chase, do hereby certify that I hand-delivered an original copy of this correct and complete autographed and sealed instrument titled, "DECLARED WITNESSED TESTIMONY", "Demand For Answers To Administrative and Procedural Matters Question. And, "Brief #3 in Support of Demand to Dismiss Court, Judges and Prosecutor Who Have No Force of Law Over The Accused." dated October 25, 2021 on October 25, 2021, to the YAVAPAI COURT CLERK located at, 120 South Cortez Street, Prescott, Arizona 86303. And, I hand-delivered an original copy of this correct and complete autographed and sealed instrument dated October 25, 2021 on October 25, 2021, to the COUNTY OF YAVAPAI prosecutors SHELIA POLK, GLEN M. ASAY, GEORGE RODRIGUEZ on behalf of the Plaintiff, OFFICE located at, 255 East Gurley Street, Prescott, Arizona 86301. Further, I, Michael Willis Chase, do hereby certify that I hand-delivered a file stamped copy of this correct and complete autographed and sealed instrument to Petitioner. Who holds the original of said instrument, file-stamped, as Michael Willis Chase's property.

Dated this 25th day of October, 2021.

  
Michael Willis Chase of the Chase Family,  
Pro Se, Principal Creditor for  
**MICHAEL WILLIS CHASE™**, which  
is a Corporate Identity, a Legal Fiction in  
**all uppercase, a decedent.** All rights reserved.

  
Seal